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INTRODUCTION
The story of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) 1 is one of legislative action and inaction, justice and injustice, and the weighing of priorities and values. Its origin and
entrenchment reveal a great deal about the values of the technology industry and the U.S. Congress. Passed in 1996, the
CDA was an attempt by Congress to accommodate competing
values and facilitate an uncertain but promising future digital
world. Since that time, this digital world has changed drastically. Some argue that § 230 is in part responsible for the growth
of the digital economy and the “Internet as we know it.” Others
argue that the “Internet as we know it” is not what we want it
to be, particularly when it comes to sex trafficking, pornography, child sex-abuse images, and exploitation. It is clear that,
whatever § 230 did for the legitimate digital economy, it also
did for the illicit digital economy.

1. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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Nowhere is this more apparent than in the world of sex trafficking. Since its recognition under federal law in 2000, 2 human
trafficking has been identified as the fastest growing criminal
enterprise in the world. 3 The International Labour Organization released its Global Estimate on Modern Slavery and concluded that forty million people in the world are victims of
modern slavery, including sexual slavery, and that women and
girls comprise 99% of victims of forced sexual exploitation,
with 25% of those victims being children. 4 This growth, which
has similar trends in the United States, is largely attributed to
the use of the Internet to facilitate the sale of human beings,
including children, for rape and sexual abuse. While exact
numbers are difficult to ascertain, it is beyond dispute that the
use of online advertising to facilitate sex trafficking is a significant factor in the increase of this form of victimization. 5
Yet, when survivors 6 or state prosecutors attempt to hold liable the very service providers who permit the advertising of
sex-trafficking victims—including children—for sale in the
largest market to buy human beings in the world, § 230 ties

2. See Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1466 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
3. See id. § 102(b)(8).
4. See ALLIANCE 8.7, GLOBAL ESTIMATES OF MODERN SLAVERY: FORCED LABOR
AND FORCED MARRIAGE 5, 39 (2017) (in partnership with the International Labour
Office of the ILO).
5 . See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 114TH
CONG., BACKPAGE.COM’S KNOWING FACILITATION OF ONLINE SEX TRAFFICKING 4–
5 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (2016); MEREDITH DANK ET AL., URBAN INST., ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE
UNDERGROUND COMMERCIAL SEX ECONOMY IN EIGHT MAJOR US CITIES 237–38
(2014); DOMINIQUE ROE-SEPOWITZ ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV., A SIX YEAR ANALYSIS
OF SEX TRAFFICKERS OF MINORS 13, 42 (2017) (finding traffickers used online advertisements in nearly two-thirds of cases studied and that “Backpage.com being
involved in cases of sex trafficking of minors is a constant theme in sex trafficking
arrests”).
6. Legal literature, advocacy, and policy pieces use the terms “survivor” and
“victim” interchangeably. This Article follows the pattern of the U.S. Council on
Human Trafficking, a survivor advisory group to the White House on human
trafficking, and utilizes both terms. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING, ANNUAL REPORT (2016). It is the view of the Author that regardless of the label, people who have lived through sex trafficking are survivors.
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their hands. 7 Defendant websites use § 230 as a sword and argue that it affords such sites immunity from liability, even if
accused of participating in child sex trafficking. Despite consensus that § 230 was never designed to create such absolute
immunity, courts have struggled to reconcile precedent from
an earlier Internet era with the reality of slavery 8 in the current
Internet age. The result has been an inability of sex-trafficking
victims and state prosecutors to proceed with cases against
such businesses that knowingly facilitate sex trafficking.
Since the emergence of this unintended reality, many have
called on Congress to update § 230 and address this problem.
More recently, sex-trafficking survivors, 9 all fifty state attor7. See generally Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017: Hearing on S. 1693 Before
the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. and Transp., 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Hearing on S.
1693] (statement of Xavier Becerra, Att’y Gen. of California).
8. The label of human trafficking as modern-day slavery is well accepted with
two American presidents, the Department of Justice, the United States Congress,
the United Nations, the United States State Department, federal courts, and Pope
Francis all invoking the term. See respectively, for example, Proclamation No.
9074, 3 C.F.R. 9074 (Dec. 31, 2012) (Proclamation by President Obama regarding
National Slavery and Human Trafficking Prevention Month); President Barack
Obama, Remarks by the President to the Clinton Global Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012)
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/
remarks-president-clinton-global-initiative [https://perma.cc/KE95-A8RP]); President
George W. Bush, Statement by His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush, President of
the United States of America: Address to the United Nations General Assembly
(Sept. 23, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/
statements/usaeng030923.htm [http://perma.cc/6PU8-7BQ7]); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Announces Creation of Human Trafficking
Prosecution Unit Within the Civil Rights Division (Jan. 31, 2007), http://
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/January/07_crt_060.html [http://perma.cc/
RH99-BAUB]; 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a), (b)(1); Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General’s Message
on the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 2, 2013),
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7321 [http://perma.cc/6ATD-D7MJ]; John
Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Annual Trafficking in Persons Report
(June 19, 2013) (transcript available at http://m.state.gov/md210911.htm [http://
perma.cc/L64A-QN5U]); Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at
Release of the Ninth Annual Trafficking in Persons Report (June 16, 2009) (transcript available at http://m.state.gov/md124872.htm [http://perma.cc/2G32VHTG]); Pope Francis, Address to Congress (Sept. 24, 2015) (transcript available
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/transcript-pope-francissspeech-to-congress/2015/09/24/6d7d7ac8-62bf-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html
[https://perma.cc/CME5-VGGE]).
9. See generally LINDA SMITH ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT IN RESPONSE TO TECH
INDUSTRY OBSTRUCTION OF SECTION 230 LEGISLATION, https://sharedhope.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/Joint-Statement-in-Response-to-Tech-IndustryObstruction-of-Section-230-Legislation-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR9F-3E8J].
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neys general, 10 and a growing number of courts 11 have called
on Congress to amend § 230 to restore it to its original purpose
of providing limited, not nearly absolute, protections for interactive computer services. Congress has failed to act thusfar.
Nevertheless, in 2017, two bills (one in each chamber) have
been proposed to address this reality.
This Article examines the development of the jurisprudence
regarding online advertising of sex-trafficking victims and juxtaposes the forces that created § 230 with those preventing its
timely amendment. This Article argues that, although § 230
was never intended to create a regime of absolute immunity for
defendant websites, a perverse interpretation of the non-sextrafficking jurisprudence for § 230 has created a regime of de
facto absolute immunity from civil liability or enforcement of
state sex-trafficking laws. This phenomenon occurred despite
the legislative intent behind § 230, and despite the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”) 12 and its subsequent
reauthorizations. 13 Part I explains the impetus behind § 230, its
history, and its text. Part II examines the rise in recognition of
sex trafficking in both domestic and international law. It further summarizes the contours of sex trafficking in the modern
world and the role online advertisement has played in its
emergence. Part III analyzes the intersection of sex trafficking,
the Internet, and § 230 and thoroughly assesses the development of jurisprudence culminating in the creation of a regime
of de facto immunity. Part IV analyzes recent legislative efforts
in both the House and Senate, arguing that the twenty-two10 . See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress Regarding
Amendment of Communications Decency Act (Aug. 16, 2017), available at http://
www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-on-letter/CDA%20Final%20Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5T2D-EGDY].
11. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016);
M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1058 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
12. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
13. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat.
227 (2015); William Wilberforce Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006); Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003);
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013, H.R. 898, 113th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2013).
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year-old statute must be amended to reflect current realities of
both the Internet and sex trafficking. Furthermore, it asserts
that such an amendment is necessary to return § 230 to its original purpose of protecting some Internet companies from specific types of liability, without creating absolute immunity.
I.

SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
A.

Historical Roots

In 1996 the Internet was in its infancy and Congress was
struggling with the implications of its development. The Internet of 1996 is unrecognizable today. 14 That “new” “dial up”
Internet engine connected people through a novel and experimental “bulletin board” through which events could be organized. 15 Newspapers were just considering having an online
presence. 16 “Google” was not a verb, and online research was
described as “tough for the amateur researcher.” 17 Congressional debate discussed floppy disk drives, usenet groups, and
message boards over telephone lines. 18 In this climate, Congress could not have imagined what the Internet would look
like two decades into the twenty-first century.
Congress did, however, recognize a concern about online exploitation. Congress’s concern was not sex trafficking because
such a term was not recognized at the time. Rather, Congress
acknowledged and expressed concern about the potential of

14. See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, Presenting: This is What the Internet Looked Like in
1996, BUS. INSIDER AUS. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/thecoolest-web-sites-from-1996-2014-4#-1 [https://perma.cc/PVB3-N2W2]; Farhad
Manjoo, Jurassic Web, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/
technology/technology/2009/02/jurassic_web.html [https://perma.cc/B6U9-KDQS].
15. See Joan E. Rigdon, Internet’s Top Use: Information Bureau, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 14, 1996, at 4.
16. See Peter H. Lewis, The New York Times Introduces a Website, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1996, at D7.
17. Bart Ziegler, The Internet – How Can I Find What I Am Looking For?, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at S10.
18. See, e.g., Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action: Hearing on S. 892, a Bill to Amend Sec.
1464 of Title 18, U.S.C., To Punish Transmission by Computer of Indecent Material to
Minors, before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 136, 161, 181 (1995).
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the Internet to spread or expose children to obscene material. 19
Section 230 was a component of a broader effort to limit access
to explicit material through the Internet. The CDA intended to
limit such access and was attached to Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 20 The CDA prohibited the knowing
dissemination of obscene material to children, and sought to
incentivize telecommunication companies to participate in
blocking explicit material from reaching children. 21 Section 230
was added to the CDA to protect tech companies. In Reno v.
ACLU, 22 the Supreme Court struck down as vague some of the
more controversial criminal provisions of the CDA, such as the
prohibition on the transmission of “indecent material.” 23 However, § 230 was not challenged, and this protection remains effective law to this day. 24 In fact, tech companies arguably
achieved the best of both worlds. After Reno, much of the CDA
that tech companies opposed was eliminated, but the provision
that was designed to protect them remained. Thus, when the
dust settled, tech companies enjoyed increased protections
without the regulations.
The statute itself explicitly outlines the purposes of § 230.
The text cannot be fully understood, however, without the context of its addition to the CDA. Because the CDA regulates the
Internet, many tech companies opposed it in principle and
fought it at every opportunity. 25 In this climate, a state court
19. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,503 (1995) (statement of Sen. Exon, author of the
CDA) (“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to provide much needed protection for children.”).
20. Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501–09, 551–52, 561, 110 Stat. 56, 133–37, 139–43
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
21. See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 59 (1995); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881
(1997).
22. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
23. See id. at 849.
24. See id. at 862, 879.
25. See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, FED. COMMC’NS
L.J. 51, 74 n.112 (1996); see also Cyberporn and Children, supra note 18, at 72–73; Child
Pornography on the Internet: Hearing on The “Protection of Children from Computer
Pornography Act of 1995” Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
(testimony of Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology); 141 CONG. REC. 19,883–84 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy, introducing the Report of Interactive Working Group on Parental Empowerment, Child
Protection and Free Speech in Interactive Media); Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex
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decision caused Congress to respond to tech companies’ concerns about regulation and liability.
In 1995, the New York Superior Court decided Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. 26 Prodigy operated a bulletin board called “Money Talks,” where members could post
information about the financial world. Widely read in the financial sector, Prodigy held itself out as a “family-oriented”
corporation that edited material placed on its bulletin boards
that it considered inappropriate. 27 Stratton Oakmont sued
Prodigy for libel for statements placed on the Money Talks bulletin board, and the state court found Prodigy responsible for
that content in part because of its active role in screening out
any material it found inappropriate. 28 Prodigy lost its protection as a mere distributor of third-party information. The court
labeled it a publisher of the information and thus responsible
for material it published. The court found Prodigy to be a publisher under state law because “it voluntarily deleted some
messages . . . and was therefore legally responsible for the content of defamatory messages that it failed to delete.” 29
Opponents of the CDA had already expressed the concern
that if the CDA were interpreted broadly, service providers
would be held criminally liable for providing minors with access to the Internet. 30 As the Fourth Circuit has observed,
“Congress enacted § 230 to remove the disincentives to selfregulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.” 31 This
case, and the concerns expressed by tech companies (including
Prodigy), prompted Congress to add § 230 to the CDA. 32 Just
from the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969, 1983 n.77 (1995)
(commenting on impossibility of monitoring all transmissions over server computers).
26. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), superseded by statute,
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, as recognized in Shiamilli v.
Real Est. Grp. of New York, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id. at *4.
29. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *4).
30. See Child Pornography on the Internet, supra note 26.
31. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
32. See Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163. Congressman Christopher Cox, who would
later become a paid lobbyist for the tech industry, cosponsored § 230 to protect
companies “who take[] steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their
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five weeks after the Stratton Oakmont decision, the text of what
would become § 230 was introduced in the House. 33
B.

Purpose

According to the Conference Report, “One of the specific
purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy
and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.” 34 Congress, therefore, sought to address two goals with
§ 230. First, consistent with the CDA’s effort to protect children
from access to obscene or explicit materials, Congress sought to
“’encourage telecommunications and information service providers to deploy new technologies and policies’ to block or filter offensive material.” 35 On the other hand, it did not want
companies to over-screen, as Congress recognized the desire
for the Internet to reach its full potential as “a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad of avenues for intellectual activity.” 36
The plain language of § 230 also provides insight into this
dual purpose by outlining five separate policies of the United
States as they existed in 1996. The first two speak to a preference for an Internet with little regulation:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services and other interactive
media;

customers.” 141 CONG. REC. 21,999 (1995). Ironically, although Stratton Oakmont
won that defamation lawsuit, in 1999 its executives pled guilty to a seven-year
scheme of stock manipulation and fraud. See Edward Wyatt, Stratton Oakmont
Executives Admit Stock Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at C3.
33. See H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. (1995).
34. H. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
35. Danielle Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Won’t Break, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 401, 404 (2017) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104–23 (1995)).
36. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012)); see also Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 2013). The opposition to the CDA generally included a concern that the Internet would be stifled,
that it would be impossible to monitor platforms, and that speech might be chilled
due to over-screening. See, e.g., Cyberporn and Children, supra note 18, at 9, 14.
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(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation[.] 37

The remaining three, however, speak to Congress’s equal goal
of shielding children and others from explicit material and,
more specifically, incentivizing technology companies to develop technology to block such material:
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower
parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws
to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer. 38

Congress enacted § 230 believing that it was “devising a limited safe harbor from liability for online providers engaged in
self-regulation.” 39 Importantly, nothing in the language suggests Congress contemplated any sort of absolute immunity. To
the contrary, Senator Grassley specifically rejected the views of
“free-speech absolutists” who believe that “Congress has no
role at all to play in protecting America’s children . . . .” 40
C.

Text

In recognition of its dual purpose, § 230(c) provides in relevant part:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening
of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2).
38. Id. § 230(b)(3)–(5).
39. Citron & Wittes, supra note 35, at 403 (emphasis added).
40. 142 CONG. REC. 1993 (1996) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 41

Section 230(c)(1) is the first source of protections for an interactive computer service. 42 Under § 230(c)(1) an interactive
computer service is protected from claims that it acted as a
publisher or speaker of content created by a third party. That is
to say, essential to the analysis of a claim against a service is
whether the claim treats the provider as a publisher or speaker
of another’s words. If so, this law precludes such a cause of action. There is no indication in the text or legislative history of
the CDA that an interactive computer service could be protected for content it created. Indeed, Congress defined an “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development
of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 43 A party “can be both an interactive computer service and a content provider.” 44 If the party is
a content provider, then the plain language of the statute offers
it no protection.
Second, § 230(c)(2) provides protection for a service provider
who takes actions “in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be ob41. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
42. “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
44. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
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scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable” or provides access to technology to do
the same. 45 Through this provision, “Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation
of content.” 46
The final indication that Congress envisioned limited protection was its rather lengthy list of laws not affected by the protections included in § 230(c). Not only does the statute provide
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.” 47 The statute also does not “prevent any State from enforcing any State
law that is consistent with this section.” 48 Finally, it has no effect on communications privacy law or intellectual property
law. 49
These provisions reflect Congress’s attempt to strike a balance between limiting access to explicit material and incentivizing service providers to police their platforms and develop
technologies that allow for screening. Congress sought to accomplish these goals by allowing the Internet to flourish with
limited regulation. Congress expressly stated that that it is the
policy of the United States “to ensure vigorous enforcement of
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.” 50 That
said, Congress appeared to recognize that unlimited tort-based
lawsuits would threaten the then-fragile Internet and the

45. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
46. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis added). This was echoed even by opponents
of the CDA who argued that child exploitation was already illegal under federal
law. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 27,969 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold); Cyberporn
and Children, supra note 18, at 15.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). This provision does, however, preclude liability imposed through a state law inconsistent with § 230. Id.
49. Id. § 230(e)(2), (4).
50. Id. § 230(b)(5).
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“freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.” 51
Although these two goals required some balancing, it is clear
from the text and legislative history of § 230 that it was never
intended to provide a form of absolute immunity for any and
all actions taken by interactive computer services. Section 230 is
not “a general prohibition of civil liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts.” 52 Rather, Congress sought
to provide limited protections for limited actions.
As this Article will discuss, the jurisprudence in this area as
it relates to sex trafficking has come unmoored, suggesting a de
facto absolute immunity from civil suit and state prosecution
for partnering with human traffickers. Prior to analyzing this
case law, it is necessary to understand the equally clear intent
of Congress to eliminate sex trafficking.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF SEX TRAFFICKING AND CLEAR
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO COMBAT IT

Noticeably absent from the list of offenses unaffected by
§ 230 are the human trafficking offenses present in federal
criminal law and the laws of all fifty states. The reason for this
is simple: the nation and the world did not codify human trafficking as a crime until four years after the passage of § 230.
A.

Sex Trafficking Legislation

2000 was a watershed year for the law’s recognition of human trafficking generally and sex trafficking in particular. The
world came together to draft the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish the Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and
Children (Palermo Protocol). 53 This document reflected the international community’s condemnation of human trafficking,
and it included a comprehensive definition of human traffick51. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). Specifically,
Congress was concerned that over-screening would lead to a decrease in the
number or types of messages circulated. Id. at 331.
52. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
53. This is one of three optional protocols to the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime. See G.A. Res. 55/25, at 31 (Jan. 8, 2001).
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ing. It further committed parties to create multidisciplinary
laws to address labor and sex trafficking. The United States
mirrored this growing recognition of human trafficking by
passing the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
(TVPA), 54 which defined and prohibited severe forms of trafficking.
In its recognition of sex trafficking as a “severe form[] of trafficking,” Congress included lengthy findings, among which
were the findings that human trafficking was “modern day
slavery,” that it was “the fastest growing source of profits for
organized criminal enterprises in the world,” and that its perpetrators perniciously “primarily target women and girls, who
are disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to
education, chronic unemployment, discrimination, and the lack
of economic opportunities.” 55 Congress explicitly acknowledged the importance of combatting this crime:
Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime with national
implications. To deter international trafficking and bring its
perpetrators to justice, nations including the United States
must recognize that trafficking is a serious offense. This is
done by prescribing appropriate punishment, giving priority
to the prosecution of trafficking offenses, and protecting rather than punishing the victims of such offenses. 56

Importantly, Congress recognized in 2000 that existing legislation, which included the CDA, was “inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect the
gravity of the offenses involved.” 57
This direct language indicated Congress’s clear intent to radically affect and confront human trafficking. 58 The approach
Congress advanced to combat human trafficking became
known as the “Four P’s”: protection, prevention, prosecution,
and partnership. 59 This comprehensive effort adopted a “vic54 . Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1466 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7112
(2012)).
55. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1), (4), (8), (19) (2012).
56. Id. § 102(b)(24).
57. Id. § 102(b)(14).
58. Id.
59. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 3 PS: PROSECUTION, PROTECTION, AND PREVENTION,
https://www.state.gov/j/tip/3p/ [https://perma.cc/WHB4-BWJV] (last visited Nov.
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tim-centered approach” to combat trafficking. In the original
TVPA, Congress recognized that human trafficking could not
be eliminated solely through federal criminal law, but instead
required diverse stakeholders to participate and support the
rights of victims. 60 The hallmarks of this Congressional approach included a comprehensive methodology that encompassed not only criminal sanctions, but also civil lawsuits,
recognition of the essential role of states in combatting human
trafficking, and recognition of the need to provide victims and
survivors with access to justice through civil private rights of
action. 61
This approach created a structure to revisit the legislation
regularly through reauthorizations updating Congress’s legal
framework as it continued to gain more knowledge about the
many forms of human trafficking. Congress had a clear intent
to pursue an aggressive approach to human trafficking in 2000,
and its fidelity to this approach is evinced through its five reauthorizations. 62
1.

Definition of Sex Trafficking

Sex trafficking includes the acts of one who “knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains,
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a
person . . . to engage in a commercial sex act.” 63 To be convicted
of such an offense, a defendant must use “force, fraud, or coercion . . . to cause the victim to engage in [the] commercial sex
act,” or the victim must be under the age of eighteen. 64 It is also
unlawful to benefit, “financially or by receiving anything of
value, from participation” in a sex trafficking venture. 65 Therefore, if one engages in any of the above acts with a person who
has been forced, defrauded or coerced into participating in a
commercial sex act, or with a minor participating in a commer20, 2017); see also INT’L HUMAN TRAFFICKING INST., THE PROBLEM, http://
theihti.org/the-problem/ [https://perma.cc/PJZ6-7JFB] (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
60. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(10).
61. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 16,705 (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
62. See supra note 13 for TVPA reauthorizations.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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cial sex act (regardless of coercion), one has committed the
crime of sex trafficking. A commercial sex act includes “any sex
act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” 66 These comprehensive definitions cover more than just traditional prostitution; they also include other methods of sexual exploitation. Similarly, they apply not ononly to pimps, but also to anyone who participates and benefits
from such exploitation. Thus, it is clear that Congress intended
a comprehensive attack on sex trafficking from the beginning.
2.

Multidisciplinary Approach with Emphasis on Victims

Congress also recognized that sex trafficking could not be
ended only through purely federal criminal law and found that
a civil right of action is necessary to combat human trafficking.
In 2003, Congress explicitly authorized a private right of action
for sex-trafficking victims to enforce the criminal sextrafficking laws, thus providing them with access to justice and
also empowering them to participate in achieving the TVPA’s
goals. 67 In 2015, Congress increased compensation and restitution for victims, reiterating the importance of victim access to
funds to address the long-term harms caused by human trafficking. 68
In addition to adopting the victim-centered approach and the
right of a federal civil enforcement action, Congress also recognized the need to combat sex trafficking at state and local levels
of government. In 2005, Congress explicitly acknowledged the
essential role of local law enforcement and prosecutors by adding a section to the TVPA entitled “Enhancing State and Local
Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons.” 69 This section established grants to “establish, develop, expand, or strengthen pro66. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(4) (2012).
67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012); see also, e.g., Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for the Trafficked
Person in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (recognizing that,
because public enforcement lacks resources to enforce civil rights of human trafficking victims, including these private rights of actions in the trafficking statutes
“is indicative that the state is willing to rely on private actors to enforce the civil
rights of trafficked persons”).
68. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 105,
129 Stat. 236.
69. 34 U.S.C. § 20705 (2012)
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grams . . . to investigate and prosecute acts of severe forms of
trafficking in persons.” 70 In so doing, Congress required that
such local entities embrace a multidisciplinary approach advocated by Congress. 71 Indeed, the State Department’s most recent Trafficking in Persons Report recognized the critical role
state and local prosecutions play in this effort, noting that most
prosecutions of human trafficking are based on state laws. 72
For nearly the past two decades, congressional intent to
combat sex trafficking has been unyielding and comprehensive. Congress is the architect of a multi-disciplinary approach
that employs the use of a private right of action, a focus on victims, and state and local law enforcement to combat sex trafficking at all levels of society.
3.

Obstacle to Achieving the TVPA’s Goal to Ending Sex Trafficking

Notwithstanding this comprehensive approach, sex trafficking appears to continue to thrive throughout the world and
across the country. As a threshold matter, it must be noted that
accurate numbers are difficult to ascertain due to the underground nature of sex trafficking, as well as the definitional variations among different studies. Nevertheless, global estimates
confirm a trend of increasing numbers of trafficking victims. 73
There are 5.9 adult victims of modern slavery for every 1,000
adults in the world, and 4.4 child victims for every 1,000 children in the world. 74 Consistent with congressional findings in
2000, 99% of the victims that the International Labour Organization characterizes as “sex slaves” are women and girls. 75
Notwithstanding such estimates, the U.S. Department of State
reported that in 2016 the legal systems of countries throughout
the world only identified approximately 66,520 victims. 76
70. Id.
71. See id. § 20705(b).
72 . See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 416 (2017),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/271339.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXY7PXUC].
73. Forty million people were victims of modern slavery in the world in 2017.
See ALLIANCE 8.7, supra note 4, at 5.
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 39.
76. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 72, at 34.
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Moreover, these same governments identified only 14,897
prosecutions. 77
Similar trends exist in the United States. The Department of
Justice only initiated a total of 241 federal human trafficking
prosecutions in 2016, a decrease from 257 in 2015. 78 It charged
531 defendants, an increase from 377 the year before, and secured convictions against 439 traffickers, a significant increase
from 297 convictions in 2015. 79 While these statistics suggest
some improvement, there can be no dispute that these federal
prosecutions in no way capture all the victims being sold into
sex trafficking each day.
Although likely many reasons exist for this increase in sex
trafficking, including simply an increased awareness of the
crime, there is little doubt that much of this increase is due to
the ease of selling children and adult victims of sex trafficking
online. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) studied its reports of suspected child sex trafficking over a five-year period and found an 846% increase in
reports of suspected child sex trafficking online. 80 NCMEC receives an average of 9,000–10,000 CyberTipline reports relating
to child sex trafficking each year. 81 Of those, 81% relate to child
sex trafficking online. 82 This crime often targets the most vulnerable in our society. A study of homeless children found that
nearly one in five have been the victims of human trafficking. 83
This corroborates NCMEC’s reporting that one in six runaways

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Human Trafficking Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, 114th Cong. 38–47 (2015) (statement of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children).
81. See Hearing on S. 1693, supra note 7 (statement of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children).
82. Id.
83. See LAURA T. MURPHY, LOYOLA UNIV. NEW ORLEANS, LABOR AND SEX TRAFFICKING AMONG HOMELESS YOUTH: A TEN-CITY STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
(2016), https://covenanthousestudy.org/landing/trafficking/docs/Loyola-ResearchResults.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WKU-AGAK] (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
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reported to NCMEC were likely victims of sex trafficking. 84
These increasing trends of child sex trafficking seem to correlate with the increased use of the Internet to sell children. Of
reports received by NCMEC to the CyberTipline from members of the public regarding suspected child sex trafficking,
73% related to ads on Backpage. 85 A Thorn study observed that
75% of sex-trafficking victims interviewed were advertised
online. 86 California Attorney General Xavier Becerra testified
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation that almost every sex-trafficking case in his office involves online marketing. 87 The consequence of this is significant, as online advertising is associated with an increase in
the number of buyers per victim. 88
These numbers are supported by common sense experience
in the business community. Successful businesses move online
where they can access potential buyers quickly and at low cost.
What the Internet economy has done for legitimate business, it
has done exponentially for illicit businesses; it provides all the
benefits of an online presence with the additional layer of anonymity. It is not surprising that these businesses have migrated
to the Internet, because sex trafficking is not only a crime but
also a highly lucrative business. As such, sex trafficking thrives
in the ecosystem the Internet creates: low-cost, low-risk, and

84. See NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD SEX TRAFFICKAMERICA: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS AND GUARDIANS 2 (2017), http://
www.missingkids.com/content/dam/ncmec/en_us/Child_Sex_Trafficking_in_Ame
rica_Parent_Gaurdian.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL67-DCAW].
85. See Hearing on S. 1693, supra note 7 (statement of Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children).
86. VANESSA BOUCHÉ, THORN, SURVIVOR INSIGHTS: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
IN DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING 38 (2018) [hereinafter BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST], https://27l51l1qnwey246mkc1vzqg0-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Thorn_Survivor_Insights_012918.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
FS66-ANN9]. This is an increase from 63% reported in 2015. See VANESSA BOUCHÉ, THORN, A REPORT ON THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO RECRUIT, GROOM AND
SELL DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING VICTIMS 10 (2015), https://
27l51l1qnwey246mkc1vzqg0-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/
02/Survivor_Survey_r5.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8D3-XQV9].
87. See Hearing on S. 1693, supra note 7 (statement of Xavier Becerra, Att’y Gen.
of California).
88. BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note 86, at 41.
ING IN
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high-profit. 89 Legal online advertising platforms provide traffickers and purchasers a highly convenient forum with limited
public exposure. 90
III.

SECTION 230 HAS THWARTED THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING

One of the reasons sex trafficking has continued to grow, despite comprehensive legislative efforts to combat it, has been
the growing use of the Internet to facilitate it through online
advertising. 91 Online advertising has been allowed to thrive
due to both the case law that has emerged regarding § 230 and
congressional inaction.
While headlines focus on Craigslist and Backpage, many
other sites are eager to partner with sex traffickers to obtain a
share of the multibillion-dollar industry. 92 These include EscortAds.xxx, Erosads.com, EroticMugShots.com, among others. 93 The impunity for facilitating sex trafficking that the Internet offers goes beyond advertising to include so called “hobby
boards,” where purchasers rate prostituted people and victims
of trafficking as they would rate a restaurant on Yelp— except
with graphic, vulgar, and violent detail. 94 The misinterpretation
of the protections of § 230 and congressional inaction led to a
stalemate. Congress’ noble and clear vision to combat online
sex trafficking continues to be unrealized and traffickers continue to advertise, buy, and sell victims with impunity. It is
important to examine how § 230 was turned on its head and
how this section of the CDA, designed to help shield children
from explicit material, has been distorted to allow companies to
facilitate children becoming the explicit material.

89. See DANK, supra note 5, at 218; BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note
86, at 36.
90. BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note 86, at 40.
91. Id.
92. 161 CONG. REC. S1621 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
93. Id.
94. See Katherine Koster, FBI & Local Police Seize Adult Entertainment Website “The
Review Board,” HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
katherine-koster/fbi-local-police-seize-th_b_8927072.html [https://perma.cc/D7MNK3RS].
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Courts Distorted § 230 and Created a Regime of De Facto
Absolute Immunity, Contrary to Congressional Intent.

While the intent of limited protections for limited actions
was clear, since 1996 courts have interpreted § 230 significantly
more broadly than the authors intended or than the words of
the statute suggest. 95 Of the several hundred § 230 decisions in
state and federal court since 1996, the vast majority have found
websites immune from liability for events occurring on them. 96
Courts “have treated the relevant statutory language as creating a broad exemption from liability even when the substantive
facts underlying a plaintiff’s claim are compelling.” 97
This state of affairs has real consequences for victims when
the cases include sex trafficking. Additionally, it implicates
other offenses such as stalking and nonconsensual pornography, which also occur online, sometimes due to the operators
of websites. 98 Demonstrating that the defendant computer service is a “bad actor” does not provide for liability. 99 This “overbroad interpretation has left victims of online abuse with no
leverage against site operators whose business models facilitate
abuse.” 100 As Professor Citron and Mr. Wittes note, “Section
230 of the CDA was by no means meant to immunize services
whose business is the active subversion of online decency—
businesses that are not merely failing to take ‘Good Samaritan’
steps to protect users from online indecency but are actually
being Bad Samaritans.” 101

95. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 35, at 408 (“The broad construction of the
CDA’s immunity provision adopted by the courts has produced an immunity
from liability that is far more sweeping than anything the law’s words, context,
and history support.”).
96. See, e.g., Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). But see
Jeffrey Kosseff, The Gradual Erosion of the Law that Shaped the Internet, 18 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016) (noting that while § 230 remains a strong shield for
tech companies, courts do not apply § 230 immunity as broadly as they once did).
97. StubHub, 727 S.E.2d at 561 (citing M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011)).
98. See People v. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 835 (Ct. App. 2016).
99. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Showing that a
website operates through a meretricious business model is not enough to strip
away those [CDA] protections.”).
100. Citron & Wittes, supra note 35, at 404.
101. Id. at 8.
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To understand how the case law developed in the manner it
did, one must first comprehend the state of the Internet at the
time of the early decisions. In 1997, when cases first percolated
through the court system, the Internet was in its infancy. The
need to protect it as an unregulated bastion of freedom appeared more pressing. Not only could courts not imagine the
Internet of today, but they also did not envision the exploitation today’s Internet fuels through the three A’s: anonymity,
access, and affordability. 102 More specifically, they could not
imagine the level of human trafficking occurring online.
1.

Early CDA Non-Sex Trafficking Cases

The initial cases did not involve sex trafficking, as it was an
unrecognized form of victimization. Hence, the relevant baseline for jurisprudence was from a series of cases having nothing to do with either the typical sex-trafficking scenario or the
scope of the problem.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc. 103 is one of the earliest cases to
address § 230, and it began a string of broad interpretations. In
this defamation case, the plaintiff argued that AOL unreasonably delayed the removal of defamatory messages, refused to
issue a retraction, and failed to remove similar repeated
posts. 104 This 1997 case focused on the legislative history calling
for unfettered free speech on the Internet, but it ignored the
language of the statute. 105 In granting AOL’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Fourth Circuit concluded that § 230
barred any cause of action that would make “service providers
liable for information originating with a third-party user.” 106
The court based its decision on a desire to incentivize companies to self-regulate. It assumed that ruling the opposite way
would expose service providers to liability if they knew of defamatory messages on their space, and that this, in turn, would
incentivize them to be willfully ignorant and to cease policing

102. See Al Cooper, Sexuality and the Internet: Surfing into the New Millennium, 1
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 187, 187–93 (1998).
103. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
104. Id. at 328.
105. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 35, at 408.
106. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
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their space. 107 Because this was a defamation case, there was no
need to balance these concerns with the CDA’s other purpose—to limit explicit content. The court’s failure to discuss
this other goal created fertile ground for courts to maintain a
singular focus on only one of § 230’s two purposes.
Additionally, the court adopted a broad definition of publisher, finding the plaintiff’s claims treated AOL as a publisher:
“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content—are barred.” 108 The court further rejected the characterization of AOL as a distributor. 109
Another important early case was Doe v. America Online,
Inc., 110 a Florida civil case in which the plaintiff accused AOL of
knowingly distributing and allowing advertisements for child
pornography, negligence, and a failure to respond to notification that its services were being utilized to distribute obscene
material. Here, the plaintiff argued that AOL was not a publisher, but a distributor. The Florida court rejected that argument, extending Zeran’s argument that websites are not distributors. 111
Doe v. America Online is important for what it did not say as
much as for what it did say. Although the case involved allegations regarding child pornography, it did not rely heavily on
the purposes of § 230 consistent with those priorities— such as
protecting children from explicit material and exploitation. Instead, the court quoted Zeran heavily, and in so doing it helped
perpetuate a broad definition of publisher and suggested that
Congress favored freedom of the Internet above all other goals.
Importantly, the Florida appellate court in Doe v. America
Online also found that § 230 preempted state law civil claims. 112

107. Id. at 333. The court was also concerned that policing the “sheer number” of
postings on would “be an impossible burden” for an interactive computer service.
Id.
108. Id. at 331.
109. Id. at 333.
110. 718 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
111. Id. at 388–89.
112. Id. at 389.
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Over the next decade, case law was built on this idea of
broad immunity, derived frequently from defamation cases. 113
At the same time, the Internet was growing in strength, and
explicit material was proliferating online. Not until 2008 did a
published appellate opinion offer some reference to a limited
immunity and hope for crime victims. In Fair Housing Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 114 the plaintiffs sought to
establish that Roommates.com was actually a content provider
and, as such, could be held liable for questions asked that violated housing discrimination regulations. As a basis for this
claim, plaintiffs noted that Roommates.com provided its users
with a drop-down menu that users had to answer to access the
service. According to the plaintiffs, this action required users to
enter certain discriminatory information such as preferences
for roommates of certain races or sexual orientations. As such,
Roommates.com was a content provider. 115 The court agreed.
Roommates provided some important additions to the jurisprudence. First, holding that Roommates.com was a content
provider made it one of the few cases to find potential liability
for a website. In so doing it recognized a website could be both
an interactive computer service as well as a content provider, at
least where the website helped to develop the information: 116
If [a website] passively displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with
respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself,
or is “responsible, in whole or in part” for creating or developing, the website is also a content provider. 117

By focusing on the text of § 230, Roommates recognized that
defendants were responsible “in part” for each profile on their
113. See, e.g., Ezra v. Am. Online, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) (defamation);
Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No. 2:04CV462FTM29SPC, 2006 WL
66724 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C.
1998) (finding the Drudge Report immune from liability for story that plaintiff
abused his wife); Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(defamation). But see Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (defendant granted immunity from negligence claim that it markets child pornography).
114. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
115. Id. at 1164.
116. Id. at 1165.
117. Id. at 1162. See also Dart v. Craiglist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967–68 (N.D.
Ill. 2009).
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website even if the content was a collaborative effort between
the website and the user. 118 The Ninth Circuit also clarified the
term “development” to include not merely augmenting the
content generally but “materially contributing to its alleged
unlawfulness.” 119
Critically, Roommates also distinguished the typical content
provider from the concerns in Prodigy. It noted that Prodigy
was sued for removing some, but not enough, material from its
sites. “Here Roommate is not being sued for removing some
harmful messages while failing to remove others.” 120 Rather, it
was being sued for causing illegal material to be displayed. The
recognition of potential liability was not without limits: “The
message to website operators is clear: if you don’t encourage
illegal content . . . you will be immune.” 121
While the early cases set the tone for this jurisprudence, a
few, such as Roommates, were open to recognizing limitations.
Importantly, the Roommates court understood the need to update legal reactions to problems. Specifically, it rejected to some
extent the knee-jerk argument that § 230 immunity was necessary to buoy a fragile Internet:
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations applicable to
brick-and-mortar businesses. . . . [W]e must be careful not to
exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and
thus give online businesses an unfair advantage over their
real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of
general applicability. 122

Therefore, Roommates offered an alternative path interpreting
§ 230 more in line with the text and original purpose of the
CDA. However, when courts considered the sex-trafficking
cases, they rejected that textual approach.

118. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1166.
119. Id. at 1167–68. Even “encouraging” unlawful content may be enough to lose
§ 230 protection. See id. at 1171.
120. Id. at 1170.
121. Id. at 1175.
122. Id. at 1164 n.15.
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Websites Block Civil Cases

By 2009, online advertising of sex trafficking was rampant,
and it had transcended its earlier status as a nuisance. Internet
advertisements allowed human traffickers to quickly sell victims to sex buyers in multiple cities. 123 The websites successfully argued that the early cases, which were decided before the
advent of online sex trafficking, protected them from any liability. They argued that they were entitled to “broad[] immuni[ty]” for disseminating third-party content. 124
Frustrated with his inability to contain sex trafficking, Cook
County Sheriff Thomas Dart sued a popular platform for such
advertisements, Craigstlist.com. His federal suit alleged a
common law claim of public nuisance, utilizing as evidence
Craigslist’s violation of local prostitution laws. 125 The District
Court dismissed this diversity jurisdiction suit for a number of
reasons. In so doing, the court reframed Dart’s argument, finding that he more accurately presented a “negligent publishing”
claim, which § 230 precludes when it “derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’” 126
In dismissing this cause of action, the trial court accepted the
allegation that traffickers routinely flouted Craigslist’s guidelines and terms of use. 127 However, the court refused to allow
the case to proceed and granted the motion for judgment on
the pleadings. 128 Unlike in Roommates, where the defendants
were responsible for the content and caused the illegal activity, 129 the court here found the defendants did not do so and,

123. See Hearing on S. 1693, supra note 7 (testimony of Yiota G. Souras, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children).
124. See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(quoting Craigslist’s assertion that § 230(c)(1) “broadly immunizes providers of
interactive computer services from liability for the dissemination of third-party
content.”).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 967–98.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 970.
129. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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therefore, could not be deemed responsible in whole or in part
for the content of the ads. 130
A different approach was taken in federal court by a survivor
of sex trafficking. As a fourteen-year-old runaway girl, M.A.
was sexually trafficked. 131 M.A.’s trafficker admitted to taking
pornographic photographs of her, displaying her private body
parts, and posting them on Backpage as advertisements to sell
her for sexual services. 132 Backpage profited from these advertisements. 133
M.A. sued Village Voice Media, the then-owners of Backpage, in federal court under the private right of action provided for victims of child pornography and sex trafficking. 134 She
alleged, inter alia, that Backpage aided and abetted her trafficker in violating the child sex-trafficking laws, child pornography
laws, and U.S. treaty obligations under the Optional Protocol of
the Convention of the Rights of the Child Against the Sale of
Children. 135
M.A. attempted to distinguish her claims from previous
plaintiffs’ efforts to hold interactive computer services liable.
She did not base her allegations on the content of the advertisements, but instead concentrated on the website’s role as a
sex-trafficking facilitator. 136 She focused on Backpage’s conduct
in developing and posting the advertisements, instructing the
trafficker on how to increase the impact of posted ads, and offering special ad placement. 137 The court accepted Roommates’
holding that a website operator can be both a content provider
and a service provider, and it found Backpage immune from
liability. 138
This early sex-trafficking opinion refers back to the late
1990s’ “broad immunity” language—a product of a time before
130. See Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
131. M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 (E.D. Mo.
2011).
132. Id. at 1043, 1045.
133. Id.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
135. M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
136. See id. at 1044–45.
137. Id. at 1044, 1048.
138. Id. at 1059.
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the modern Internet, the conceptualization of human trafficking, and the unforeseen explosion of online sex trafficking. 139
Repeatedly citing to defamation cases, 140 which are clearly distinguishable from child trafficking cases, the court concluded
that Congress chose a policy of “broad immunity” in all § 230
cases. 141 The court recognized the inherent conflict in cases involving § 230 immunity and cases where individuals are directly harmed, noting that “[t]he legislative resolution of these issues will, indirectly, shape the content of communication over
the Internet. For now . . . § 230 of the [CDA] errs on the side of
robust communication, and prevents the plaintiffs from moving forward with their claims.” 142 The court, relying on the early cases that did not deal with sex trafficking, asserted that
Congress created a policy giving content providers nearabsolute immunity. 143
The tone of this decision reflects the struggle of courts in trying to reconcile two separate congressional purposes. On the
one hand, courts are trying to be attentive to § 230’s purpose.
Congress clearly listed its dual purposes in § 230(a), and one of
those purposes involves the protection of children. 144 Unfortunately, many early cases did not have to address child protection and only referred to the other purpose of § 230. 145 These
cases mischaracterized the congressional purpose as one focused primarily on the goal of a free and unfettered Internet;
the equally significant goal of protecting children and precluding the dissemination of explicit material was often ignored. As
such, courts created an impression that the immunity provided
was broader than intended and existed for only one purpose.
On the other hand, courts must reconcile this with Congress’s
unmistakable intent to combat sex trafficking, which it has
demonstrated by authorizing civil enforcement actions and
criminal laws that target sex traffickers. Congress intended to
139. See id. at 1051.
140. See id. at 1053.
141. See id. at 1051.
142. Id. at 1053 (alteration in original) (quoting PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s
Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071–72 (D. S.D. 2001)).
143. Id.
144. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2012).
145. See id.
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disrupt the sex-trafficking business model at many different
pressure points.
Unfortunately, when courts adjudicating sex-trafficking cases look to precedent for guidance, they inevitably find the older
cases, which emphasize not the plain language of the statute
but only a portion of the statute’s findings. M.A. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings 146 exemplifies this struggle. There, the court
acknowledged M.A.’s characterization of immunity for a website “that solicits and facilitates illegal conduct” as “indefensible.” 147 However, the opinion follows with the sentiment, “regardless of M.A.’s characterization of the policy choice of
denying § 230 immunity in such circumstances as alleged as
‘clear,’ it nonetheless is a matter Congress has spoken on and is
for Congress, not this Court, to revisit.” 148 The opinion closes
with the court underscoring this point and suggesting a frustration with reconciling these two pieces of legislation: “Congress has declared such websites to be immune from suits arising from such injuries. It is for Congress to change the policy
that gave rise to such immunity.” 149
Of course the problem with this analysis is that it is far from
clear that Congress declared such websites to be immune from
liability. Indeed, the word “immunity” is nowhere to be found
in the statute. 150 The statute was designed to limit access to explicit material, not enable a website to successfully claim immunity when such an image appears on its platform and facilitates the actual trafficking of the person depicted. Yet, due to
the language of early precedents from a different time regarding a different type of situation—murky defamation as opposed to clear child sex trafficking—the M.A. court adopted
Backpage’s argument that websites are immune even when facilitating sex trafficking. 151

146. 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 (E.D. Mo. 2011).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1053.
149. Id. at 1058.
150. See J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, 718 (Wash. 2015)
(en banc) (Wiggins, J., concurring).
151. M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.

582

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 41

It is essential to note that this case, like all those that courts
dismissed, was dismissed pretrial on immunity grounds. 152
That is to say, survivors as plaintiffs were denied an ability to
get through the courthouse door. Importantly, they were also
denied discovery to access the documents that would have
demonstrated the extent to which these websites facilitated sex
trafficking.
3.

Backpage Blocks State Regulation

Having failed to successfully assert state law claims to impede online advertising of sex-trafficking victims for sale in
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 153 and then federal civil claims in M.A.,
states and victims found their hands tied. In the wake of these
thwarted efforts, a legally protected public market to buy and
sell sex-trafficking victims arose. States next attempted to pass
new laws prohibiting this business practice. The response from
one online advertising company was swift and aggressive. At
the time, Backpage was the second largest online advertising
platform in the United States. Its revenue was estimated to be
$150 million dollars with much of that deriving from online
“adult” advertisements. 154 And in M.A., Backpage had successfully argued that it possessed broad immunity to advertise
online for the sale of sex-trafficking victims under § 230.
In an effort to oppose open marketplaces where children
were bought for sex, Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey
all passed legislation targeting online advertisements for prostituted persons as well as victims of sex trafficking. 155 The objective of these laws was to end the large marketplaces for
online sex trafficking. These laws resulted from states’ growing
frustration with their inability to combat this problem. For example, in Backpage.com v. McKenna, 156 Washington police identified a minor victim whose images repeatedly appeared in

152. Id. at 1059.
153. 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967–68 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
154. See 163 CONG. REC. S3977 (daily ed. July 13, 2017) (statement of Sen. Portman).
155. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(b)(1) (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13314 (WEST 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.101 (West 2017).
156. Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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Backpage’s advertisements even after they notified the site. 157
Backpage initially removed the images but they continued to
reappear. 158 The seemingly never-ending ability to advertise
the same victim spurred these legislative responses.
Backpage successfully enjoined all of these laws from being
enforced. Courts found that § 230(e)(3) expressly preempted
state laws that were inconsistent with the immunity found
therein. 159 Given that one of the purposes of the CDA is to protect children from exposure to explicit materials, 160 one could
argue these laws were not inconsistent with the Act. However,
McKenna found the criminalization of the knowing publishing
or displaying of such ads was inconsistent with the CDA, because such criminalization incentivized service providers to not
monitor the content that goes through their channels. 161
This holding is mistaken. The CDA was clearly enacted to
protect from liability an ISP who monitors for explicit material,
but in good faith fails to capture everything, as the defendant
did in Prodigy. 162 The CDA was not intended to protect the
company that monitors, discovers illegal content, profits from
it, and allows it to spread on its platform. 163
The CDA made this original distinction in the policy section
of § 230. 164 However, by the time of these three cases, Backpage
and the courts heavily relied upon the early CDA cases that did
not involve trafficking. McKenna accurately noted that a “majority of federal circuits have interpreted [§ 230] to establish
broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third157. Id. at 1267–68.
158. Id. at 1268.
159. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 823 (M.D. Tenn.
2013); Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13-cv-03952, 2013 WL 4502097, at *18
(D. N.J. Aug. 20, 2013); McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
160. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2012).
161. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
162. See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063194,
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
163. McKenna also stated that liability upon notice would cause providers to
abstain from self-regulation. 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1278. However, the Washington
law would not create liability upon knowledge, but upon knowledge and failing
to act and remove the illegal content. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.101
(West 2017). This is entirely different.
164. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (2012).
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party user of the services.” 165 While statistically accurate, the
assertion of such a broad rule was inconsistent with the intent
of the limited protections of the CDA.
Although the constitutionality of these state laws is beyond
the scope of this article, the CDA basis for the opinions illustrates its misconstruction. For example in Backpage.com v.
Cooper, 166 apparently emboldened by the de facto immunity
created for these companies in the online advertising arena,
Backpage argued even further that the statute “is preempted by
the CDA because § 230 of the CDA prohibits state laws from
imposing liability on interactive computer services for thirdparty content, even if the content is unlawful and the website had
reason to know of the unlawfulness.” 167 Such a position is ironic to
say the least. These actors utilized the Good Samaritan provision of the section of the CDA entitled “Protection for Private
Blocking and Screening or Offensive Material” to claim immunity for knowingly providing access to unlawful material. 168
Unfortunately, the courts allowed this distortion. 169
4.

Websites Block Efforts to Disrupt the Business Model of
Advertising Sex-Trafficking Victims for Sale

By 2015, the use of online advertisements to sell human trafficking victims, particularly child sex-trafficking victims, was
expansive and significant. NCMEC found the increase in reports of child sex trafficking “directly correlated to the increased use of the Internet to sell children for sex.” 170 An Urban
165. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096,
1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009)) (first emphasis added).
166. Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).
167. Id. at 821–22 (emphasis added). It should be noted the term “de facto absolute immunity” used throughout this article refers to immunity from civil liability
and state prosecution of its sex-trafficking laws. While § 230 does allow for enforcement of federal criminal law, to date the Departmnet of Justice has not prosecuted Backpage.com or similar sex trafficking websites.
168. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
169. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
170. Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of Online Sex Trafficking: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. On Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Backpage.com Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Rob Portman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Investigations) (quoting testimony of
Yiota G. Souras, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, The National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children).
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Institute study of eight U.S. cities found that the market for
commercial sex and the trafficking of children within it had
expanded as a result of the Internet’s rise as a new venue to
buy and sell women and children for sex. 171 Similarly, the Department of Justice found that there was an increase in the
profitability of sex trafficking of children through the Internet,
making it a more attractive venue for sex traffickers. 172
Notwithstanding the undeniable growth in online advertisements and its significant role in increasing sex trafficking,
courts continued to deny these aforementioned efforts to civilly
sue these companies. As discussed above, courts also rejected
state-level legislative approaches. In fact, in 2013, forty-nine
state attorneys general wrote to Congress demanding that it
amend § 230 back to its original limited protection and allow
states to enforce their own criminal laws:
The involvement of these advertising companies is not incidental—these companies have constructed their business
models around income gained from participants in the sex
trade. But, as it has most recently been interpreted, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) prevents
State and local law enforcement agencies from prosecuting
these companies. This must change. The undersigned Attorneys General respectfully request that the U.S. Congress
amend the CDA so that it restores to State and local authorities their traditional jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
those who promote prostitution and endanger our children. 173
171. DANK, supra note 5, at 237–38; BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note
86, at 38.
172. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION
PREVENTION & INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2010). This finding was
repeated in the National Strategy Report of 2016, which found that sex traffickers
were emboldened by technology including online advertising. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 91 (“Internet-based advertising platforms facilitate the commercial sexual exploitation of minors in cities and towns throughout the country.”). Backpage’s monthly revenue from advertisements in the “adult” section
was estimated to be $9 million. Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 236 (7th
Cir. 2015).
173. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress to Amend § 230 of
the CDA (July 23, 2013)), available at https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=historical [https://perma.cc/94DQ-PW34].
All fifty state attorneys general renewed that request in 2017. See Letter from Nat’l
Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress, supra note 10.
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They, like so many others, recognized Backpage as the leading
platform for these advertisements. Congress did not act on
these requests.
With their hands tied, members of local legislatures and law
enforcement experienced growing frustration regarding their
inability to address these problems and enforce state antitrafficking laws that have been recognized by the federal government as the primary legal weapon against sex trafficking. 174
Unable to sue civilly or utilize state laws, Sheriff Tom Dart took
efforts to pressure different aspects of the business model.
On June 29, 2015, Dart sent a letter on official stationary to
the Chief Executive Officers of MasterCard and Visa asking
these companies to “immediately cease and desist” allowing
their credit cards to process payments regarding Backpage. 175
Dart claimed he embarked on this campaign to stop the human
trafficking facilitated in Backpage’s “adult” section. 176 Backpage responded with litigation, seeking a preliminary injunction against Dart. 177 Although the district court denied Backpage’s motion, 178 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed. 179 The Circuit Court found that Sheriff Dart, “in his
public capacity,” cannot “issue and publicize dire threats
against credit card companies that process payments made
through Backpage’s website, including threats of prosecution . . . in an effort to throttle Backpage.” 180 Although Visa filed
an affidavit stating it did not feel threatened by Dart’s letter,
the Court noted that a letter from a government official in his
official capacity that, in its view, contained legal threats, was
coercive. 181
While the holding of the opinion is not surprising, the fullthroated support for Backpage is worthy of note. Not only did
Judge Posner characterize Dart’s actions as an effort to “throttle
174. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 72, at 389.
175. Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 2015).
176. Id. at 230.
177. Id.
178. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 127 F. Supp. 3d 919, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2015),
rev’d, Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015).
179. Dart, 807 F.3d at 239.
180. Id. at 235.
181. Id. at 233, 236.
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Backpage.com,” 182 he also stated that “it is unclear that Backpage is engaged in illegal activity.” 183 This is a point that was
disputed by forty-nine state attorneys general and seemingly
rejected in M.A. despite that court’s interpretation of § 230 immunity as broad enough to cover illegal activity. 184 As will be
discussed below, this seems to no longer be an open question.
However, without being able to reach discovery, litigants have
not been able to solidify their claims.
5.

State Civil Litigation Outside the Scope of § 230

Having been blocked on every front in their attempts to hold
online advertisers accountable for advertising children and
human trafficking victims for sale, victims and state attorneys
general found themselves unable to proceed past motions to
dismiss to even get to the discovery that would substantiate
their claims. Not only had efforts to sue in federal court failed,
but also efforts to pass state laws had been stopped through
litigation from the online advertisers, and efforts to disrupt the
business model were enjoined. Plaintiffs then turned to state
law claims for allegations based on state torts and not the
online advertisments.
In Washington, one case, J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings,
LLC, 185 survived a motion to dismiss and was allowed to proceed to discovery on track for trial. The reasons for this success
are many. While the holding is an important departure from
the previous jurisprudence, the analysis of the concurring opinion is perhaps more significant.
Plaintiffs, all minors, were advertised and sold for sex on
Backpage and alleged in their lawsuit that Backpage knowingly
helped their traffickers. Baruti Hopson prostituted J.S. and was
convicted of rape, assault, and prostitution. 186 Plaintiffs alleged
numerous state law claims including “negligence, outrage,
sexual exploitation of children, ratification/vicarious liability,
unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, sexual assault and bat182. Id. at 235.
183. Id. at 233.
184. M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (E.D.
Mo. 2011).
185. 359 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2015) (en banc).
186. Id. at 716 n.1.
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tery, and civil conspiracy.” 187 Backpage moved to dismiss the
case, offering its traditional argument that § 230 provided it
with such broad immunity that even if the plaintiffs were alleging acts beyond publishing third-party content, it would still be
immune from liability. 188 Plaintiffs responded that Backpage
received no immunity because its actions involved not simply
publishing but also developing rules that were “designed to
help pimps develop advertisements that can evade the unwanted attention of law enforcement, while still conveying the
illegal message.” 189 The case survived a motion to dismiss on
the trial level and the defendant moved for discretionary review by the Washington State Supreme Court. This Court held
that the plaintiffs pleaded a case that survived the motion to
dismiss and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 190
Before analyzing the reasoning of the Washington Supreme
Court, it is important to note that the case benefited from two
distinctions from previous cases. First, the standard for a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in Washington is very high. As the
state high court noted, “12(b)(6) motions should be granted
‘sparingly and with care’ and ‘only in the unusual case in
which plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the
complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.’” 191 Furthermore, the court noted that “[d]ismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is
appropriate only if ‘it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that
no facts exist that would justify recovery.’” 192
In applying this standard, the majority concluded that the
claims were permissible. The majority recognized that § 230(e)
precluded state causes of action inconsistent with the CDA.
Noting that the CDA allows litigation against content providers, the majority identified the issue as whether the allegations
treated Backpage as an information content provider that was

187. Id. at 716.
188. Id. Backpage also removed the case to federal district court, which then
remanded the claims to state court. Id. at 716, n.2.
189. Id. at 716.
190. Id. at 715–16.
191. Id. at 716 (quoting Cutler v. Phillips Petrol Co., 881 P.2d 216, 219 (Wash.
1994) (en banc)).
192. Id. (quoting In re C.M.F., 314 P.3d 1109 (Wash. 2013) (en banc)).
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subject to state law liability. 193 Recognizing Roommates’ conclusion that a website can be both a content provider and an interactive computer service, the majority concluded that many of
the claims “alleged facts that, if proved true, would show that
Backpage did more than simply maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content.” 194 The claims included allegations that Backpage developed content that is designed to
allow pimps to traffic underage girls and evade law enforcement, that its posting rules are a fraud aimed to assist evading
law enforcement, and that the content requirements are designed to allow pimps to traffic in sex to Backpage’s profit. 195
As such, the majority found these allegations were consistent
with Roommates’ standard of contributing materially to illegality of the conduct, and thus survived a motion to dismiss.
While this majority holding is important, as it was the first
court to allow a state claim to reach discovery, the more insightful aspect of the opinion arguably arose from the concurrence. The majority appeared to largely accept the conventional
framework of § 230 but did not blindly follow these precedents
when not on point with present sex-trafficking cases. Justice
McCloud, writing in dissent, accepted the conventional view
that § 230 provided broad immunity for Backpage even if these
allegations were of illegal activity. 196
Justice Wiggins, writing in concurrence, fully supported the
majority approach but wrote separately to clarify that plaintiffs’ claims did not treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker
and to vehemently reject Backpage and the dissent’s view that
§ 230 provides immunity to such defendants. 197 The crux of his
opinion states:
Subsection 230(c)(1) instead provides a narrower protection
from liability: the plain language of the statute creates a defense when there is (1) a provider or user of an interactive
computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a
state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker of infor-

193. Id. at 717.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 718.
196. See id. at 724 (McCloud, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 718 (Wiggins, J., concurring).
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mation (3) that is provided by another information content
provider.
Thus, when the cause of action does not treat an intermediary as a publisher or speaker, subsection 230(c)(1) cannot be
read to protect that intermediary from liability. 198

For the first time in a sex-trafficking case, a judge did not
blindly accept an online advertiser’s claim of unbounded immunity, even for actions that are possibly criminal or outside
the role of publisher. In so doing, Justice Wiggins first turned
to the plain language of the statute, observing it does not recognize any immunity—even a limited one. He noted that the
protections afforded interactive computer services are twofold.
First, § 230(c)(1) “precludes treating an interactive computer
service provider as publisher or speaker of information provided by another provider.” 199 Second, § 230(c)(2) provides that
such a service provider cannot be liable for good faith action to
restrict access to objectionable material or any action making
available the technical means to restrict such access. 200 Therefore, as long as a plaintiff does not treat the defendant as a publisher or a speaker, he can proceed with a cause of action.
Justice Wiggins even challenged the notion that such narrow
statutory language created any form of immunity at all:
“Backpage.com’s argument that section 230 ‘provides broad
immunity to online service providers’ is wholly unsupported
by the statute’s plain language—subsection 230(c) says nothing
about ‘broad immunity.’” 201 In addition to invoking the plain
language of § 230, Justice Wiggins also relied on the context in
which it was passed. In so doing, Justice Wiggins resurrected
the procedural history regarding protection of children long
ignored. The concurrence went on to note:
The main purpose of subsection 230(c) is not to insulate providers from civil liability for objectionable content on their
websites, but to protect providers from civil liability for limiting access to objectionable content. Ironically, the dissent

198. Id. at 718–19.
199. Id. at 719.
200. See id.
201. Id.
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would turn section 230 upside down, insulating plaintiffs
from expanding access to objectionable content. 202

Indeed, some of the legislative history characterizes § 230 as
a provision that “allows an on-line service to defend itself in
court by showing a good-faith effort to lock out adult material.” 203
Turning to the efforts by Backpage in this litigation, as well
as those of Craigslist and Village Voice, Justice Wiggins noted
the perversity of using § 230 to justify Backpage’s actions: “[I]t
would be absurd to ignore [the language about good faith in
230(c)(2)] in order to protect the actions of Backpage.com, taken
in bad faith, that have nothing to do with publishing or speaking another’s content.” 204 Justice Wiggins stripped down the
defendant’s argument and labeled it what Backpage was in fact
demanding: absolute immunity. He correctly noted that the
reading advocated by Backpage “would absolutely immunize
providers who allow third parties freedom to post objectionable materials on the providers’ websites.” 205
Justice Wiggins’ concurrence reveals Backpage’s claims for
what they are: claims of absolute immunity from civil or statelaw liability arising from a statute whose language and context
do not indicate such an intent. But perhaps even more importantly, Justice Wiggins’ concurrence also chastises other
courts for relying on the early § 230 cases to create de facto
immunity. 206 The concurrence noted that even the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had “retreated” from its early language of
broad immunity to finding that no “general immunity” is present in the text’s language. 207
J.S. is the only published case to have survived a motion to
dismiss and to have been upheld by an appellate court. 208 It
202. Id. at 720.
203. 141 CONG. REC. 15,106 (1995).
204. J.S., 359 P.3d at 720.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 721.
207. See id. at 721 (citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009)).
208. As of this writing, a pending case in an Alabama state circuit court has
denied a motion to dismiss without issuing an opinion and Backpage is appealing. See K.R. v. Backpage.com, LLC, No. 38-cv-17-900041 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2017). A
U.S. District Court in Florida has denied Backpage’s motion to stay discovery
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was scheduled for trial in October 2017. However, after Senate
subcommittee hearings on the CDA and on the night before a
House Judiciary Committee hearing on the CDA, Backpage settled the case. 209
6.

Federal Sex Trafficking Civil Cases

Victims who had been similarly trafficked through the use of
Backpage filed a federal lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts that was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. 210 Despite Congress’s clear intent in 18 U.S.C. § 1595 to
allow victims to sue traffickers, the plaintiffs in this lawsuit did
not fare as well as those in Washington state court. Three Jane
Doe plaintiffs alleged that they were trafficked and advertised
on Backpage, resulting in the three being raped over 1,900
times in total. They sued, accusing Backpage of engaging in the
trafficking of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 and the parallel
civil right of action in 18 U.S.C. § 1595. They also alleged the
same claim under the Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking
Victim Protection Act, 211 violations of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, 212 and some intellectual property claims
regarding their images. The district court granted Backpage’s
motion to dismiss. 213
On appeal, the First Circuit recognized that in the twentyfirst century, courts need to address not only the intent of Congress in 1996 when it passed the CDA, but also the more recent
intent of Congress when it passed the TVPRA, and the allowance for a private right of action for victims. 214 The plaintiffs’
complaint went beyond alleging that Backpage published inpending its motion to dismiss on § 230 grounds. See Fla. Abolitionist v. Backpage.com, LLC, No. 6:17-cv-218-Orl-28TBS (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2017).
209. See Backpage.com settles suit by 3 Washington women who said they were sold for
sex as teens, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/crime/backpage-com-settles-suit-by-3-washington-women-who-said-theywere-sold-for-sex-as-teens/ [https://perma.cc/RWP2-AL5U].
210. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
211. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 50(a) (West 2017).
212. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West 2017).
213. Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 17.
214. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2012). The Court noted, “These laudable legislative
efforts do not fit together seamlessly, and this case reflects the tension between
them.” Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 15.
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appropriate advertisements; it also alleged that Backpage engaged in a campaign to distract attention from its active role in
sex trafficking. These actions included, among other things,
making false statements to NCMEC and law enforcement regarding its efforts to fight sex trafficking while, in fact, deliberately creating a website that facilitates sex trafficking. 215 Backpage allegedly did so by establishing payment structures
through digital currency, stripping photographs uploaded in
advertisements of metadata to prevent law enforcement discovering its location of origin, only charging a fee to “adult entertainment” advertisements, allowing traffickers to sponsor
ads in the “escort” section of the platform, and similar actions. 216 Despite these claims being directly tied to legal causes
of action outside the role of publisher, the First Circuit found
them precluded by § 230.
Citing to the very early § 230 cases, the First Circuit adopted,
without analysis, the preference “for broad construction” of the
CDA. 217 Indeed, the court characterized this liberal construction
as resulting in “a capacious conception of what it means to
treat a website operator as the publisher or speaker of information provided by a third party.” 218 With that broad interpretation of the narrowly written CDA, the First Circuit then concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPA were, in fact,
ones that treated Backpage as a publisher. 219
Even if that were the case, in determining congressional intent, the First Circuit could have looked at the more recent
pronouncement of congressional intent in the TVPA, which
made sex trafficking a crime, prioritized prosecution, and provided victims the right to sue their traffickers and those who
engage in a sex-trafficking enterprise with sex traffickers, and
concluded that congressional intent was more recent and more
clear with this legislation. 220 However, citing back to the 1997
Zeran case and a 2007 First Circuit case addressing a financial
bulletin board, it rejected Justice Wiggins’ concurrence in J.S. in
215. See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 16.
216. See id. at 16–17 & n.2.
217. Id. at 18–19.
218. Id. at 19.
219. See id. at 22.
220. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595 (2012).
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a footnote and concluded that the alleged actions of Backpage
were decisions of a publisher deciding what content to circulate and what to not. 221 Regarding the existence of the TVPRA
claims, the First Circuit made a stunning statement of absolute
immunity:
[E]ven if we assume, for argument’s sake, that Backpage’s
conduct amounts to “participation in a [sex-trafficking] venture”—a phrase that no published opinion has yet interpreted—the TVPRA claims as pleaded premise that participation
on Backpage’s actions as a publisher or speaker of thirdparty content. The strictures of Section 230(c) foreclose such
suits. 222

Thus, the First Circuit expanded the concept of broad immunity from 1997 to include immunity for participating in a
sex-trafficking venture. In so doing, it asserted that the basis of
this immunity was a statute Congress enacted in part to protect
children from exposure to explicit materials. No court has gone
so far as to conclude that § 230 was designed for this form of
absolute immunity—even for criminal sex trafficking. The regime of de facto absolute immunity was firmly entrenched
through this holding.
The First Circuit did join the early M.A. case’s chorus to
amend the CDA and clarify the tension between the TVPA and
the CDA. In so doing, however, the court referenced only one
of the purposes of the CDA, ignoring its purpose to protect
children from exposure to explicit material, by stating: “If the
evils that the appellants have identified are deemed to outweigh the First Amendment values that drive the CDA, the
remedy is through legislation, not through litigation.” 223
7.

State Criminal Law Efforts

In the wake of these attempts to limit the sale of children
online over the objection of the tech lobby, Congress passed the
221. See Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 18–19, 21 n.5 (citing Universal Commc’n Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714
(Wash. 2015) (en banc)).
222. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). It bears mentioning that “participation in a [sex
trafficking] venture” is expressly criminalized by 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).
223. Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 29.
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SAVE Act which amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to include “advertising” among the actus rei that encompassed sex trafficking. 224
As such, advertising a minor knowing she is a minor, to engage
in a commercial sex act, as well as advertising a person one
knows to be the victim of sex trafficking through force, fraud,
or coercion is also illegal. Thus, federal prosecutors could prosecute the pimps who place ads online as human traffickers, as
well as the advertisers who know the victims are minors or
adult victims of sex trafficking. 225 Emboldened by its successful
elimination of three state laws seeking to make advertising illegal, Backpage sued the Department of Justice asserting a preenforcement First Amendment challenge to the Act. 226 Indeed,
Backpage referenced those prior efforts in its filings attempting
to assert standing. However, the District Court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Backpage didn’t and couldn’t claim that it
was engaging in a course of conduct that both affected a constitutional interest and was proscribed by the SAVE Act or gave
rise to a credible threat of prosecution. 227 Notably, as of this
writing, Backpage has not been charged under this section of
the act.
Having been unable to proceed against Backpage through
federal civil law, state civil laws, federal criminal laws, and the
creation of state criminal law, state attorneys general struggled
to find a way to combat companies like Backpage. In 2016, the
California Attorney General took action not against Backpage
itself, but against its owners: Carl Ferrer, Michael Lacey, and
James Larkin. California arrested and criminally charged these
men initially with conspiracy to pimp, pimping, and pimping
of a minor for their roles in running Backpage. 228 California alleged that defendants created and organized a website that al224. Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, tit.
I, § 118, 129 Stat. 247.
225. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 3d 96, 108 (D.D.C. 2016)
(noting that “while it might be true that some Congressional members had Backpage.com in mind when enacting the SAVE Act, the statute is ‘aimed’ at individuals who knowingly advertise or benefit from advertising sex trafficking”).
226. See id. at 100.
227. See id. at 110.
228. People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE019224, 2016 WL 7237305 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 9,
2016).
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lows sex trafficking to take place “with the intent to derive
support and maintenance” from the resulting prostitution, and
that they derived that support from the advertisements they
and others placed on EvilEmpire.com and BigCity.com. 229 The
defendants filed a demurrer, arguing that the CDA had such
breadth of immunity that it even applied to state criminal
charges of pimping.
The Superior Court granted defendants’ demurrer, but its
discussion of the case law on the topic and the need for Congress to amend § 230 to reflect current times is instructive. First,
the court recognized that the State had “a strong and legitimate
interest in combating human trafficking by all available legal
means. Moreover, any rational mind would concur that the
selling of minors for the purpose of sex is particularly horrifying and the government has a right and a duty to protect these
most vulnerable victims.” 230 However, the court went on to
note that this state interest can be overcome. Here, the court
noted the origin of the CDA with the Prodigy case, and the reality that several courts had interpreted it broadly. 231 Tellingly,
however, the court also noted, “Congress has had ample opportunity to statutorily modify the immunity provision if it
disagrees with prevailing judicial application of this provision.
Congress has not done so, and the current legal framework
binds this Court.” 232
Having expressed this reservation regarding the case law
and congressional inaction, the court examined the People’s
arguments that the CDA did not protect the defendants when
they knowingly committed those crimes. The prosecution focused on its allegation that the defendants were collecting information put onto Backpage by third parties, and repackaging
it to create a kind of dating site on BigCity.com as well as a
phone directory on EvilEmpire.com. 233 The prosecution analogized this to People v. Bollaert, 234 in which the defendant was

229. Id. at *2.
230. Id. at *1.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at *4–5.
234. 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
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convicted for creating a revenge pornography site where he
encouraged people to post illegal information about others. 235
However, the court rejected this analogy, noting that Bollaert
required the third parties to post illegal information that violated another’s privacy, but the defendants did not require
such unlawful information. 236 The court characterized this as
simply reposting third-party information which was traditionally a publishing function protected by the CDA. 237
Regarding the pimping charges, the court noted that the immunity of the CDA “has been extended by the courts to apply
to functions traditionally associated with publishing decisions,
such as accepting payment for services and editing.” 238 As
such, the court found that the CDA as currently interpreted,
protected the alleged action—as these charges were seeking to
treat the defendants as publishers. It joined the First Circuit
and the Middle District of Tennessee in asking Congress to
clarify this conflict between the legitimate state interest to end
sexual exploitation and congressional “foreclosure of prosecution” by stating, “Congress has spoken on this matter and it is
for Congress, not this Court, to revisit.” 239
Not to be deterred, however, the State of California again
sought criminal charges against these same defendants, this
time alleging money laundering as well as pimping. 240 Now,
having twice had criminal allegations deemed to be protected
by the CDA, the defendants argued that their immunity was
“clear” and the charges were now in the category of “bad
faith.” 241 After rejecting the defendants’ arguments to reassign
the case to the previous judge who dismissed the original conduct, the court addressed defendants’ claim that the First
Amendment barred all charges. The court rejected this claim as
to the money laundering charges, but accepted it as to the
pimping charges, for many of the same reasons as the court
235. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305, at *5.
236. Id. at *5–6.
237. Id. at *7.
238. Id. at *10.
239. Id. at *11.
240. People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 23,
2017).
241. Id. at 3.
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had done previously. 242 However, the court also relied heavily
on the Jane Doe holding from the First Circuit to afford broad
immunity to the alleged criminal activity of the defendants. 243
B.

Analysis of Case Law

Over the two decades since the passage of the CDA and
eighteen years since the passage of the first TVPA, three questions emerge. First, how did the jurisprudence arrive at a position so diametrically opposed to the intent of these two pieces
of legislation? Second, why has Congress failed to act to correct
this problem? Third, what brought about and what is the significance of recent congressional activity?
1.

Evolution of the Law

The arc of this jurisprudence is of concern. A common denominator through these years has been the strength of the tech
industry in influencing congressional action and inaction.
In 1996, Congress was primarily concerned with the potential exposure of children to explicit material. 244 This concern
was prophetic, as the Internet has proven to be a bastion of
pornography and its easy access to children is of real concern.
Researcher Michael Seto has described the early and pervasive
exposure to Internet pornography among children and youth
as “the largest unregulated social experiment of all time,” 245
and the effect this material is having on the juvenile brain is
profound. 246 Resistance from the tech industry to any sort of
limit on such material was strong. 247 Additionally, Congress
intended to permit the Internet to develop with little regulation, in order for it to become a place of free speech. Consequently, Congress created the CDA, but also added to it § 230
to speak to these latter concerns. Specifically, in response to
242. See id. at 11.
243. Id. at 14–15, 18.
244. Supra note 20.
245. MARY AIKEN, THE CYBER EFFECT 16–17 (2016) (quoting Michael Seto).
246. See generally NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF: STORIES
OF PERSONAL TRIUMPH FROM THE FRONTIERS OF BRAIN SCIENCE (2007).
247. Parker Higgins, The Web’s First Blackout Protest: The CDA, 20 Years Later,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/
02/webs-first-blackout-protest-cda-20-years-later [https://perma.cc/EN7A-QMN7].
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Prodigy, Congress sought to protect companies that were good
Samaritans from being held liable for trying to limit access to
explicit material.
Today the case law, with some exceptions, is anything but reflective of that purpose. Instead, a body of law has developed
thwarting congressional intent. Not only are courts espousing
“broad immunity” provided by the CDA, but they are even
holding that websites that engage in criminal activity are immune from liability. They have done so notwithstanding that
immunity is nowhere to be found in the plain language of
§ 230, and that absolute immunity was never the intent. 248
Identifiable forces seem to be at play in this development.
One is the finding of the early cases such as Zeran that the CDA
provides “broad immunity” with scarcely a reference to the
intent of Congress to limit access to explicit materials. Indeed,
this is not surprising given that Zeran and many of the earlier
cases were defamations cases—a chief concern of service providers. As such, it in some way makes sense that their reference
to the other purposes of § 230 is limited.
However, two trends have occurred since those early cases.
First, Congress declared sex trafficking a crime in 2000 249 and
created a private right of action as an essential enforcement
tool in 2003. 250 Congress went on to emphasize the importance
of both the private right of civil suit for survivors of trafficking
as well as the essential role state and local entities play in combatting what Congress has labeled “modern slavery.” 251
Secondly, sex trafficking has exploded in large part due to
the Internet. 252 Once it became apparent that these websites offered a place where traffickers could actually advertise victims

248. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 36, at 408. See generally Fair Hous. Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
249. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1466, 1487–88 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.).
250. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108193, § 4(a)(4)(A), 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595).
251. See supra note 8.
252. Phone calls to the National Human Trafficking Hotline have increased
steadily since its inception. See Hotline Statistics, NAT’L HUMAN TRAFFICKING
HOTLINE (June 30, 2017), https://humantraffickinghotline.org/states [https://
perma.cc/45F4-786N].
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for sale with impunity, the problem only grew. 253 While
Craigslist and Backpage were and are the largest online sites,
others, some even more egregious, have emerged. 254 Additionally, related online websites have developed where purchasers
rate their victims in the most egregious of terms—a veritable
Yelp system to rate prostituted persons—many of whom are
victims of trafficking. 255
As a result, courts have struggled to reconcile these two
manifestations of congressional intent. Yet when they turn to
precedent for guidance, they are met with a series of pre-sex
trafficking cases asserting a “broad immunity.” They are guided to this by litigants that argue for unprecedented immunity—immunity that would not be present if they were brickand-mortar companies engaged in the exact same behaviors.
Yet amici, many of whom are significantly funded by technological companies, also argue that this de facto absolute immunity applies to otherwise-criminal conduct. 256 This is notwithstanding the fact that:
The [CDA] was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land
on the Internet. The CDA instead prevents website hosts
from being liable when they elect to block and screen offensive material, and it encourages the development of the In253. BOUCHÉ, TECHNOLOGY IN DMST, supra note 86, at 38.
254. Id.; see also Daniel Fisher, Backpage Takes Heat, But Prostitution Ads Are Everywhere, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2012/01/
26/backpages-takes-heat-for-prostitution-ads-that-are-everywhere/#60bb9223095f
[https://perma.cc/RHE5-EMFM]; Human Trafficking Online: Cases and Patterns, U. S.
CAL.
TECH.
&
HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
PROJECT
(2011),
https://
technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/report/human-trafficking-online-cases-patterns/
#_ftn49 [https://perma.cc/SE9Y-733D]; Marissa Louie, Craigslist Saga: The Great
Migration of Sex Trafficking Ads, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 13, 2011), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/marissa-louie/craigslist-saga-the-great_b_808314.html
[https://perma.cc/CA3S-GA9J] (noting the top ten advertisement sites include
Eros.com and TheEroticReview.com).
255. E.g., Sasha Aslanian, Battle against sex trafficking turns to prostitution review
sites, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/09/16/world/
battle-against-sex-trafficking-turns-prostitution-review-sites [https://perma.cc/MM2FL28U].
256. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation & Center for Democracy and
Technology as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–10, J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) (No. 90510-0), 2014 WL
4808971 at *7–9; see also CONSUMER WATCHDOG, HOW GOOGLE’S BACKING OF
BACKPAGE PROTECTS CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING 21–25, 27, 32 (2017), http://www.
consumerwatchdog.org/resources/backpagereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXF3-4H4Y].

No. 2]

The Indecency of Section 230

601

ternet by not permitting courses of action, such as defamation, that would treat the web host as the publisher or
speaker of objectionable material. Neither of these directives
requires us to blindly accept the early premise of “broad
immunity.” 257

The judicial inability to keep § 230 tied to its original intent has
added to confusion.
2.

Curious Record of Congressional Action and Inaction

Given the growth of sex trafficking fueled by online advertising, the lack of congressional action is remarkable. This Article
opened with a discussion of justice and injustice. It is here that
comparison between congressional action in 1996 and 2017 is
necessary.
In 1996 Congress sought to regulate aspects of the Internet
related to explicit material, pornography, and children. 258 In
response to the opposition to the CDA by service providers
and one arguably wrongly decided case, Prodigy, Congress included § 230 in the CDA. Congress made an effort to address a
nascent Internet and a concern about explicit material. Congress, in 1996, responded to one bad case and the perceived
need of corporate interests to enact § 230.
Until late 2017, Congress was unresponsive to several poorly
decided cases and the actual needs of sex-trafficking survivors,
yet it continued to be responsive to the corporate interests of
the tech industry. By 2017, every other institution in society has
called for an amendment to the CDA, including victims and
survivors, 259 survivor victims’ organizations, 260 law enforcement, 261 all fifty state attorneys general, 262 and several courts.
California courts have expressed reservation in dismissing
criminal charges, and noted that Congress must act to clarify
257. J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714, 724 (Wash. 2015) (en
banc) (Wiggins, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
258. See 141 CONG. REC. 3203 (1995) (statement by Sen. James Exon, referencing
Sandy Rovner, Molesting Children by Computer, WASH. POST., Aug. 2, 1994, at Z15).
259. Supra note 9.
260. Id.
261. See Groups in Support of Amending the Communications Decency Act, NAT’L
CTR. ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, http://endsexualexploitation.org/cda/ [https://
perma.cc/R8DA-VG76] (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
262. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Congress, supra note 10.
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the status of the law because it is functioning as a protection to
human traffickers: “If and until Congress sees fit to amend the
immunity law, the broad reach of § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act even applies to those alleged to support the exploitation of others by human trafficking.” 263 As far back as
2009, a U.S. district court sounded the alarm when dismissing
an early sex-trafficking case, finding that “Congress has declared such websites to be immune from suits arising from
such injuries. It is for Congress to change the policy that gave
rise to such immunity.” 264 The First Circuit directed survivors
to pursue legislative change after expanding CDA protection to
criminal activity. 265
It is remarkable that the 1996 Congress, with little information on what the Internet would become, was willing to respond to the objections of one group and the decision of one
court. Yet, when faced with a mountain of information—much
of which is from the government itself—about the harm of
these advertising sites, no congressional action occurred. In
2008, Congress enacted legislation demanding an annual report
to Congress on efforts to combat child sexual exploitation. A
“key finding” of the 2016 National Strategy was that
“[w]ebsites like Backpage.com have emerged as a primary vehicle for the advertisement of children to engage in prostitution.” 266 Yet, Congress has not amended the CDA to hold such
websites accountable.
The numerous cases that have seemed to thwart the TVPA’s
intent also did not spark Congress to set § 230 right. Instead,
263. People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013, slip op. at 18 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 23,
2017); see also People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE019224, 2016 WL 7237305, at *11 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016). (“Congress has spoken on this matter and it is for Congress,
not this Court to revisit.”).
264. M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1058 (E.D.
Mo. 2011).
265. See Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016)
(“The appellants’ core argument is that Backpage has tailored its website to make
trafficking easier. . . . [A]ppellants have made a persuasive case for that proposition. But Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet when it enacted the CDA,
and it chose to grant broad protections to internet publishers. . . . If the evils that
the appellants have identified are deemed to outweigh the First Amendment values that drive the CDA, the remedy is through legislation, not through litigation.”).
266. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 76.
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Congress allowed the regime of de facto absolute immunity to
thrive, causing courts to assert that § 230 even protects companies from allegations of criminal activity. This has continued
even as courts ask Congress to clarify the state of the law. Observers have offered many explanations for why § 230 has not
been amended. One is the power of the tech industry. 267 The
tech industry’s resistance to amendment of § 230 is not surprising because it offers them a competitive advantage against
brick-and-mortar competitors, as well as immunity for all their
activities. Indeed, at the time of pending legislation, not only
had the industry actively opposed the legislation, it was seeking similar immunity to be added into the NAFTA renegotiations. 268
IV.
A.

FUTURE

Recent Legislative Actions

Starting in 2016, some movement in Congress occurred to
address this narrow issue of de facto immunity for service providers that partnered with sex traffickers. This was due to a
number of factors, the most pressing of which included revelations regarding the activities of one of the major online advertising sites, Backpage.
It is important to remember that when these entities successfully win a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the case is dismissed prior to
discovery. As a result, these defendants can successfully shield
their illegal activity from scrutiny. Backpage’s litigation and
lobbying strategy included both denying the accusations and
asserting that it was, in fact, helping to stop sex trafficking. 269
The plaintiffs and state attorneys general were caught in an
impossible situation: they could gather some information to
form the basis of their allegations, but to truly obtain the doc267. E.g., Hany Farid, Technology sector should not be shielding sex traffickers online,
HILL (Sept. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/351315-technologysector-should-not-be-shielding-sex-traffickers-online [https://perma.cc/8FA7-L2DR].
268. Peter Mackay, New NAFTA must not provide immunity for sex traffickers, TORONTO STAR (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2017/
11/02/new-nafta-must-not-provide-immunity-for-sex-traffickers-mackay [https://
perma.cc/CC57-ULBA].
269. Backpage.com Hearing, supra note 170, at 1.
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umentation of internal corporate workings needed to prove
their arguments at trial, they needed to obtain discovery. Yet
they were precluded from doing so, due to Backpage’s successful efforts to have cases dismissed before discovery.
As early as 2011, Backpage’s outsized role in sex trafficking
had started to raise concerns. Forty-five state attorneys general
authored a letter outlining several cases involving Backpage,
labeling it a “hub” of sex trafficking and requesting documents
regarding its business practices. 270 In April 2015, the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations began an investigation into Internet sex trafficking. 271 As part of that investigation,
the Subcommittee sought records and testimony from Backpage and its officers. Backpage refused to comply. Over several
months, Backpage’s non-compliance continued, culminating in
Backpage’s CEO, Carl Ferrer, failing to appear before Congress
under order of a subpoena. 272 As a result, for only the fifth time
in forty years, the United States Senate unanimously adopted a
resolution directing Senate Legal Counsel to bring an action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1365 in federal court to enforce its subpoena. 273
Carl Ferrer and Backpage objected, asserting numerous First
Amendment arguments in opposition to the subpoenas. The
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected all of them.
The court noted that Backpage had successfully invoked § 230
to avoid liability and that congressional interest in sex
trafficking and in Backpage’s procedures is legitimate. 274 In so
doing, the court made several important statements about the
breadth of Ferrer’s First Amendment claims:

270. Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Samuel Fifer, Esq., Counsel for
Backpage.com LLC (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/press_
releases/2011/083111backpageletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRX9-CF7J].
271. See Senate Permanent Subcomm. v. Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C.
2016), vacated as moot, 856 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
272. Backpage.com Hearing, supra note 168, at 12. For a comprehensive discussion
of the machinations of negotiation, response, and non-compliance between the
Subcommittee and Backpage.com, see id. at 10–16; Senate Permanent Subcomm., 199
F. Supp. 3d at 128–33.
273. See Backpage.com Hearing, supra note 170, at 12; 162 CONG. REC. S1561 (daily
ed. Mar. 17, 2016) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
274. Senate Permanent Subcomm., 199 F. Supp. 3d at 136 n.4.
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The First Amendment does not give Mr. Ferrer an “unlimited license to talk” or to publish any content he chooses.
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected [this view]
throughout its history . . . .
....
. . . [T]he Constitution also tells us that Mr. Ferrer cannot use
the First Amendment as an omnipotent and unbreakable
shield to prevent Congress from properly exercising its constitutional authority. 275

After more extensive document review as the case went
through the appellate courts, the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations finally issued its report.
The report’s title, “Backpage.com’s Knowing Facilitation of
Online Sex Trafficking,” 276 indicates its conclusion. The report
finds that for years, Backpage had falsely and publicly denied
that it was involved in any work with sex traffickers and had
held itself out as a leader in protecting people from abuse. 277
Indeed, this denial was in the face of allegations from Thomas
Dart, J.S., Jane Doe, and M.A. The Senate Subcommittee found
that “internal company documents obtained by the Subcommittee conclusively show that Backpage’s public defense is a
fiction.” 278 The Report goes on to make three main findings.
First, Backpage knowingly concealed evidence of criminality
by editing its advertisements and deleting some words to avoid
law enforcement detection. Nevertheless, it still published the
advertisement even though this filter “changed nothing about
the true nature of the advertised transaction or real age of the
person being sold for sex.” 279 Second, Backpage knowingly facilitated child sex trafficking. 280 Finally, Backpage misleadingly
claimed that it was sold to a foreign entity when, in fact,
275. Id. at 139. The opinion went on to quote Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA, 808 F.3d 882,
894 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he advertising of illegal activity has never been protected
speech.”) and Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“The First
Amendment does not protect speech that is itself criminal because it is too intertwined with illegal activity.”). See id. at 140.
276. Backpage.com Hearing, supra note 170.
277. See id. at 1.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 2; see also id. at 17–36.
280. See id. at 3, 36–42.
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through a series of shell corporations, Carl Ferrer, Michael
Lacey, and James Larkin had remained its owners. These individuals structured the transactions to hide the fact that they
retained ownership. 281
Despite the scathing nature of this report, Congress took no
immediate action to amend the CDA. This was the case, even
though a major reason this information did not come to light
was Backpage’s ability to use § 230 to prevent civil cases from
reaching the discovery phase, and to enjoin state criminal laws
aimed at such actions. In July 2017, however, a Washington Post
investigation uncovered further evidence of Backpage partnering with a contractor in the Philippines to create content and
facilitate prostitution, from which Backpage profits. The Post
noted, “For years, Backpage executives have adamantly denied
claims made by members of Congress, state attorneys general,
law enforcement and sex-abuse victims that the site has facilitated prostitution and child sex trafficking.” 282
Then, in August of 2017, Senators Rob Portman and Richard
Blumenthal introduced the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act
(SESTA) in the Senate. 283 Earlier that year, Representative Ann
Wagner introduced the Allow States and Victims to Fight
Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) in the House of Representatives. 284 Both bills sought to address the actual problem raised
by the courts: § 230 immunity.
These bills were originally met with staunch opposition.
Google called SESTA “a disaster” 285 and “a mistake of historic
proportions,” 286 and dispatched its top lobbyist, former Con281. See id. at 3, 42–48.
282. Tom Jackman & Jonathan O’Connell, Backpage has always claimed it doesn’t
control sex-related ads. New documents show otherwise., WASH. POST (July 11, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/backpage-has-alwaysclaimed-it-doesnt-control-sex-related-ads-new-documents-show-otherwise/2017/07/
10/b3158ef6-553c-11e7-b38e-35fd8e0c288f_story.html [https://perma.cc/E6ES-LBT8].
283. S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017).
284. H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017).
285. Tom Jackman, Internet companies drop opposition to bill targeting online sex
trafficking, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
true-crime/wp/2017/11/07/internet-companies-drop-opposition-to-bill-targetingonline-sex-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/5PRB-YUU4].
286. Tom Jackman, Tech companies push back as Congress tries to fight online sex
trafficking, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
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gresswoman Susan Molinari, to lead the charge against the legislation. 287
In the fall of 2017, however, tech companies such as Google,
Facebook, and Twitter faced pressure from another front. It
was revealed that their sites were used by the Russian government to spread disinformation and possibly affect the 2016
Presidential election. 288 This revelation, combined with a discussion of the role of social media in inspiring white supremacy and violence, caused some to question the passivity with
which tech companies approached third-party content. 289 After
the revelation of Russia’s use of social media to influence the
election, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism held a hearing regarding this passivity. At the hearing,
senators raised numerous questions about the need for government regulation because of those companies’ failure to
act. 290
During this hearing, representatives from Google, Facebook,
and Twitter repeatedly testified about the work they were doing to self-regulate, despite a growth in sex trafficking and dis-

true-crime/wp/2017/09/18/tech-companies-push-back-as-congress-tries-to-fightonline-sex-trafficking/?utm_term=.f6641d4c574c [https://perma.cc/WHQ3-2CPT].
287. See id.; see also Nicholas Kristof, Google and Sex Traffickers Like Backpage.com,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/googlebackpagecom-sex-traffickers.html [https://nyti.ms/2xRg2Cs].
288. See Nancy Scola & Ashley Gold, Facebook, Twitter: Russian actors sought to
undermine Trump after election, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/10/31/facebook-twitter-post-election-russian-meddling-sought-toundermine-trump-244380 [https://perma.cc/3WLA-WHBS].
289. Noah Kulwin, Twitter is still trying and failing to solve its white supremacy
problem, VICE NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/gydda7/
twitter-is-still-trying-and-failing-to-solve-its-white-supremacy-problem
[https://perma.cc/273L-T9W3].
290. See Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech to
Find Solutions: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) [hereinafter Extremist Content Hearings] (statements of Sen. Klobuchar, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, on pending legislation and need for an ‘outside enforcer” and Sen. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, contrasting regulation in broadcast media and the lack of regulation
in social media), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/extremist-contentand-russian-disinformation-online-working-with-tech-to-find-solutions
[https://perma.cc/3TPZ-GAHY].
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information. 291 They made similar claims to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence the following day. 292 Some senators
expressed frustration and skepticism. 293 At least one senator,
John Cornyn, expressly connected tech companies’ inaction
with their opposition to the legislation to amend the CDA. 294
After two days of this testimony, the Internet Association reversed a months-long campaign and announced its support for
an amended SESTA with newly drafted changes in its favor. 295
The Internet Association is the trade association representing
global Internet companies, though it is unclear how many of
their members actually support the legislation or even if the
Internet Association itself actually does. 296
This tactical move should not have been surprising. Considering the scrutiny facing tech and its ability to lobby for even
more concessions in this narrower version of SESTA, supporting SESTA was a small price to pay to be able to point to an
291. See id. (statements of Richard Salgado, Director of Law Enforcement and
Information Security at Google, and Colin Stretch, Facebook Senior VP & General
Counsel).
292. See generally Social Media Influence in the 2016 Elections: Hearing Before S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.intelligence.
senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-social-media-influence-2016-us-elections
[https://perma.cc/A8DJ-VQHA].
293. See id.
294. See id. (statements of Sen. Cornyn, Member, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
295. Statement in Support of the Bipartisan Compromise to the Stop Enabling Sex
Trafficking Act, INTERNET ASS’N (Nov. 3, 2017), https://internetassociation.org/
statement-in-support-of-the-bipartisan-compromise-to-stop-enabling-sextrafficking-act-sesta/ [https://perma.cc/VE9H-SQYN]. The Association’s members,
who are also members of NetChoice, include Facebook, Google, AOL, Airbnb,
eBay, Expedia, and Lyft. Compare Our Members, INTERNET ASS’N, https://
internetassociation.org/our-members/ [https://perma.cc/Z788-SZ86] (last visited
Nov. 21, 2017), with Members Include, NETCHOICE, https://netchoice.org/ [https://
perma.cc/5U73-HU37] (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). Additionally, 21st Century Fox,
a NetChoice member, separately supported SESTA. See Letter from Chip Smith to
Sen. Rob Portman and Sen. Richard Blumenthal, available at https://www.
scribd.com/document/358823893/091317-FOX-Section230 [https://perma.cc/LTV8BXHR] (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
296. The Internet Association claims to support SESTA. However, as discussed
infra, the Association supported a substitute House FOSTA bill, which thwarted
SESTA’s objectives. See Support for the “Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act,” U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUDICIARY COMM., https://
judiciary.house.gov/allow-states-victims-fight-online-sex-trafficking-actsupporters/ [https://perma.cc/8TPU-ATZB] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
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action for the common good. Notably, however, Google and
Facebook did not vigorously support SESTA, and groups tied
to Google and Facebook continued to oppose it. 297
The Internet Association’s one statement in public support of
SESTA, however, was belied by tech’s actions in the House regarding FOSTA. 298 Initially, of the two bills, FOSTA was the
more forceful, holding companies responsible for recklessly
disregarding sex trafficking on their platforms. Therefore, it
was unsurprising that the Internet Association claimed support
for SESTA and not FOSTA after congressional scrutiny. However, some observers have speculated that this was a ruse, particularly because once SESTA gained traction in the Senate,
tech moved its efforts to stop any amendment to the CDA to
the House of Representatives. 299

297. See CONSUMER WATCHDOG, supra note 256, at 21–25, 27, 32–33; Congress
Shouldn’t Rush SESTA, Amendments to Section 230, TECH FREEDOM (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://techfreedom.org/congress-shouldnt-rush-sesta-amendments-section-230/
[https://perma.cc/2GLH-UWH2]; Elliot Harmon, Internet Association Endorses Internet Censorship Bill, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/11/internet-association-endorses-internet-censorshipbill [https://perma.cc/LG5G-74XF]; see also Cecilia Kang, Internet Giants Face New
Political Resistance in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/20/technology/internet-giants-face-new-political-resistancein-washington.html [https://nyti.ms/2jLmKqG].
298. The evidence that the tech industry has effectively controlled Congress
through its massive lobbying power continues to mount. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo,
Can Washington Stop Big Tech Companies? Don’t Bet on It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/technology/regulating-tech-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5Y7-2Q7A]; David Pridham, How Google Tries to Buy Government, FORBES (July 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidpridham/2017/
07/19/how-google-tries-to-buy-government/ [https://perma.cc/RW2R-AU6D];
Olivia Solon & Sabrina Siddiqui, Forget Wall Street — Silicon Valley is the New Political Power in Washington, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/sep/03/silicon-valley-politics-lobbying-washington
[https://perma.cc/9DRM-C9H9] (noting that Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple,
and Amazon spent $49 million in lobbying in 2016).
299. See Nitasha Tiku, Are Tech Companies Trying to Derail the Sex Trafficking Bill?,
WIRED (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/are-tech-companies-tryingto-derail-sex-trafficking-bill/ [https://perma.cc/S734-NXSK]. Indeed, following
these events, not only did a new tech-written bill emerge from the House,
Craigslist “hired prominent Washington D.C. law firm Sidley Austin to advocate
on Capitol Hill against [SESTA].” Jon Gingerich, Craigslist Calls on Lobbying Support to Fight Sex Trafficking Bill, O’DWYERS (Dec. 18, 2017), http://
www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/9917/2017-12-18/craigslist-calls-lobbyingsupport-fight-sex-trafficking-bill.html [https://perma.cc/WK5K-E2JD].
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Tech companies opposed both SESTA and FOSTA when they
were introduced, treating the bills as equally harmful to their
business and unnecessary. In its original form, however, FOSTA was the more aggressive of the two as it included language
regarding child pornography and proposed a lower mens rea
standard of recklessness. 300 This bill also directly amended
§ 230 to deny immunity from state and federal private rights of
action as well as state sex-trafficking and child pornography
criminal laws. 301 However, FOSTA changed significantly after
SESTA gained momentum.
Within one week of the Internet Association publicly supporting the bill, the Senate Commerce Committee voted the
SESTA substitute out of Committee. This event was unprecedented. For years victim and survivor groups had been unable
to motivate Congress to clarify § 230. Now, for the first time,
the Senate was questioning big tech’s blanket immunity. While
it at first appeared that tech organizations had bowed to pressure, it seems that they just moved the battleground to the
House of Representatives. The day after SESTA passed the
Senate Committee, Senator Ron Wyden, one of the original authors of § 230, put a hold on the bill, despite numerous survivors urging him not to do so. 302 In November, over thirty antitrafficking organizations and advocates wrote a joint letter to
members of the House objecting to efforts to propose a new
FOSTA bill. 303 Within weeks, the House Judiciary Committee
proposed a new version of FOSTA over victims’ and survivors’
objections, and the new Goodlatte FOSTA substitute version
was met with uproar from the victim community. This version
no longer included a private right of action on the federal or
the state level. 304 Instead it was unresponsive to § 230 problems
and created a new federal offense regarding prostitution. 305

300. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. § 4 (as introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017).
301. See H.R. 1865 §§ 3–4 (as introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017).
302. See World Without Exploitation, MEDIUM (Nov. 28, 2017), https://medium.com/
world-without-exploitation/senator-wyden-survivors-urge-you-to-support-sestab6735afe47c7 [https://perma.cc/B58B-FFAQ].
303. See Tiku, supra note 299.
304. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018).
305. See id. § 3.
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The language of this new version can be traced back to an
October 2017 House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations. The subcommittee
held a hearing on FOSTA in which tech trade associations proposed this approach. At that hearing, one of the original authors of § 230, Chris Cox, testified as a witness. 306 It is no surprise that as a representative from southern California, he
worked with lawyers from Prodigy and AOL to create § 230
immunity. At the hearing on amending the CDA, Cox testified
not in his capacity as a former congressman, but as a paid representative for NetChoice, 307 a trade group of tech companies
partially funded by Google.
Cox acknowledged that “Section 230 was never intended to
provide legal protection to websites that promote sex trafficking,” 308 that “in enacting Section 230, it was not [Congress’s]
intent to create immunity for criminal and tortious activity on
the internet,” 309 and that Congress intended a federal policy
“that is entirely consistent with robust enforcement of state
criminal and civil law.” 310 This would seem to suggest that there
was a willingness to amend § 230 to clarify those powers.
However, the Cox-NetChoice proposal went out of its way to
propose everything but amending § 230. Rather, the CoxNetChoice proposal was to have Congress reaffirm that § 230
does not provide immunity for content creators. 311 This was not
306. Online Sex Trafficking and the Communications Decency Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm.
of the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) ) [hereinafter Online Sex Trafficking Hearing]
(statement of Chris Cox, Outside Counsel, NetChoice), https://judiciary.
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Testimony-of-Chris-Cox-NetChoice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UD82-LW55].
307. Id.; see also Tom Jackman, House committee targets online sex trafficking by
amending the Mann Act, puzzling advocates, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/12/12/housecommittee-targets-online-sex-trafficking-by-amending-mann-act-puzzlingadvocates/ [https://perma.cc/L8ES-GWAQ].
308. Online Sex Trafficking Hearing, supra note 306, at ii; see also id. at 1 (“It was
equally intended to ensure that those who actually commit wrongs will be subject
to prosecution by both civil and criminal law enforcement.”); id. at 3 (“[T]he investigation and prosecution of sex trafficking must not be impeded by federal law
meant to protect the innocent and punish the guilty.”).
309. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
311. Id. at 11.
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responsive to the articulated concerns regarding § 230. The
Cox-NetChoice proposal then suggested creating a different
federal crime attached to the Travel Act. 312
The Goodlatte substitute FOSTA mirrored the CoxNetChoice proposal, except instead of amending the Travel
Act, it amended the Mann Act and targeted prostitution. 313 In
so doing, it removed any substantive amendment to § 230 for
human trafficking civil suits, and only carved out the ability for
states to prosecute under the new Mann Act statutes if they
passed such a law on the state level. It did retain the ability of
state prosecutors to prosecute violations of § 1591 on the state
level. The House Judiciary Committee passed this out of committee notwithstanding opposition from all major national victim survivors groups and survivors, who noted that they publicly withdrew their support and asked the co-sponsors to do
the same. 314
It bears noting that, notwithstanding critics commenting that
these bills would alter the Internet, that view has been significantly rejected. Professor Citron and Mr. Wittes convincingly
argue that amending the CDA “will not break” the Internet and
that it is the natural historical cycle to have a new industry unregulated in its early years, after which the industry grows to a
point that it needs some regulation. 315 Many tech companies,
including Oracle, Walt Disney, Hewlett Packard, 21st Century
Fox, IBM, and the Recording Industry Association of America,
312. See id. at 26–28.
313. Compare id., with H.R. 1865 § 3 (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018).
314. See Mary Mazzio, Anti-online sex trafficking bill gets crushed under Big Tech’s
lobbying, HILL (Dec. 17, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/365295-antionline-sex-trafficking-bill-gets-crushed-under-big-techs-lobbying [https://perma.cc/
6KEV-JW8T]; see also Jackman, supra note 307. The House Judiciary Committee
highlighted the support of advocacy groups. See Support for the “Allow States and
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act,” supra note 296. Of those groups listed,
only three are human trafficking organizations. Over thirty of the leading human
trafficking organizations opposed this new bill. See Jackman, supra note 307; Tiku,
supra note 299. Furthering speculation this was a legislative maneuver by tech, the
Internet Association also announced support for this Goodlatte substitute FOSTA.
See Statement In Support Of Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking
Act of 2017 (FOSTA), INTERNET ASS’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://internetassociation.org/
statement-support-allow-states-victims-fight-online-sex-trafficking-act-2017-fosta/
[https://perma.cc/2U4D-T22N].
315. See generally Citron & Wittes, supra note 35.
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have come to support one or both bills. 316 Each bill was six pages or less and neither was radical. While at one time, the bills
were similar, this legislative move by tech created two different
bills, only one supported by victims and survivors. SESTA clarified § 230. FOSTA created a new prostitution-focused federal
crime, but did not significantly alter § 230, thus allowing § 230
to remain an obstacle to victims’ access to justice.
1.

Goodlatte Substitute FOSTA

It appeared in February 2018 that the legislative effort to
amend § 230 would fail. The Goodlatte Substitute FOSTA supported by tech companies seeking to preserve de facto absolute
immunity was substantially different from SESTA in the Senate.
In its original form, FOSTA sought to accomplish the same
goals as SESTA, but in a slightly more comprehensive manner.
For example, it had a mens rea of recklessness. 317 Further, the
original FOSTA recognized the connection between sex trafficking and child pornography, which is referred to as child
sexual exploitation in the criminal code. 318 Child pornography
constitutes a visual depiction of a child engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. 319 Some of these advertisements meet the federal definition of child pornography, and the original FOSTA
sought to disallow immunity for a site that knowingly or recklessly engages in such conduct. 320 Additionally, the original
FOSTA sought not only to allow state criminal law to be enforced, but also victim restitution under any state criminal
statutes for sex trafficking and child pornography as well as a
private right of action on both the state and federal levels. 321

316. See Press Release, Sen. Rob Portman & Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Senators
Welcome Support from IBM for the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act,
https://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=3ACB83B306B2-40B5-84DB-BC16A3D3F765 [https://perma.cc/VU4G-682E] (last visited Nov.
11, 2017).
317. See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. § 4 (as introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017).
318. See id. § 3(a)(2) (as introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017). These references
were eliminated in the modified version of the bill.
319. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2012).
320. H.R. 1865 § 4(a)(2) (as introduced in House, Apr. 3, 2017).
321. Id.

614

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 41

However, the original FOSTA bore little resemblance to the
Goodlatte substitute. SESTA and the original FOSTA were responsive to the problem identified by the courts, survivors, and
state prosecutors: § 230 immunity. The Goodlatte FOSTA substitute follows the Cox-NetChoice proposal: it proposed a new
criminal law having nothing to do with the § 230 immunity
problem, it repeats the language of § 230, and it codifies some
of the problematic case law that has precluded victim and survivor access to justice.
Central to the Goodlatte FOSTA substitute was the creation
of a new crime: Promotion or Facilitation of Prostitution and
Reckless Disregard of Sex Trafficking. 322 This section is nonresponsive to the § 230 immunity issue. The problem regarding
online advertising of trafficking victims has not been a lack of
laws. For nearly two decades sex trafficking, conspiring to engage in sex trafficking, and facilitating sex trafficking have
been illegal federally and today every state has sex-trafficking
laws. The problem is that state prosecutors cannot utilize their
laws because of § 230, and courts such as the First Circuit and
California Superior Court have stated that until Congress
amends § 230, websites seem to be immune from prosecution
even if partnering with human traffickers. While there likely is
value to a criminal charge for promoting prostitution, this has
never been the problem at issue in the § 230 debate.
The proposed crime is an amendment to the Mann Act which
addresses prostitution that involves interstate commerce. 323
This makes it illegal to “use[] or operate[] a facility or means of
interstate of foreign commerce or attempts to do so with the
intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another.” 324
The statute has an aggravated penalty if the offender promotes
or facilitates the prostitution of five or more people or “acts in
reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to
sex trafficking in violation of 1591(a).” 325
If the statute stopped with this provision, it could possibly
have helped address the issue of prostitution websites that are
322. H.R. 1865 § 3 (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018).
323. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2012).
324. H.R. 1865 § 3(a) (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018).
325. Id.
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clearly related to sex trafficking. The Goodlatte Substitute
FOSTA, however, required proof that a website intentionally
facilitated prostitution. Intent requires the showing of purposeful or knowingly facilitating prostitution. As a result, the use of
code language, innuendo, and ambiguity that is prevalent in
these ads present similar challenges to prosecutors. Nonetheless, if the proposed new crime were simply these provisions, it
could be another tool in the federal prosecutor’s arsenal to fight
prostitution, even though it does nothing to address the § 230
problem.
However, the proposal did not end there. In the section entitled “Civil Recovery” the proposal stated a victim of this new
statute may recover damages in federal court. 326 This seemed to
allow a federal civil right of action, but the proposal was very
deceptive. The next sentence gutted this intent by stating,
“Consistent with section 230 [of the CDA,] a defendant may be
held liable, under this subsection, where promotion or facilitation of prostitution activity includes responsibility for the creation
or development in whole or in part of the information or content provided.” 327 This language is exactly like the Cox-NetChoice proposal and was proposed precisely because it did not create a
private right of action. It simply repeated the language of § 230,
which has been interpreted to mean that a website is immune
from prosecution or civil action unless it is a content creator.
Most of the prior cases except J.S. have found that the allegations against such websites are precluded because “claims that
a website facilitates illegal conduct through its posting rules
necessarily treat the website as a publisher or speaker of content provided by third parties and, thus, are precluded by section 230(c)(1).” 328

326. Id.
327. Id. (emphasis added).
328. Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016); see also
M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049–53 (E.D. Mo.
2011) (finding Backpage.com immune from suit because being a website operator
who does make editorial decisions about the ads is not sufficient to be considered
a content provider and “Congress . . . [has] provid[ed] immunity even where the
interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.’”) (quoting Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.
44, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998)).

616

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 41

Additionally, this version provided an affirmative defense if
the defendant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction where the ad “was
targeted.” 329 Given the global nature of the Internet, this was a
significant loophole. “Targeted” was undefined and could
mean anywhere geographically close to such locations. It is legal to sell sex in Canada, 330 parts of Mexico, 331 and certain counties in Nevada. 332 Furthermore, there are efforts to legalize
prostitution in various states throughout the country, including
in Washington, D.C., California and New Hampshire. 333 With
this broad affirmative defense, a website could simply assert it
was “targeting” an audience in one of these locations and be
exempt from suit in every state that borders Canada, Mexico,
or Nevada. Similarly, with the term “targeted” undefined, it is
unclear if that means the act would have to take place there, the
prostituted person be located there, or if the potential purchaser be located there.
The Goodlatte FOSTA substitute referenced § 230 and allowed for state prosecution of violations of state sex-trafficking
laws for conduct that would violate 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a). 334 Thus,
this version did allow states to prosecute websites under this
329. H.R. 1865 § 3(a) (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018).
330 . See Legalities of Prostitution, EDMONTON POLICE SERV., http://www.
edmontonpolice.ca/CommunityPolicing/FamilyProtection/Prostitution/Legalities
ofProstitution.aspx [https://perma.cc/42WB-7MZJ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
331. See Ronald Weitzer, Mexico’s State-Run Brothel Shows Us The Benefits Of Making
Prostitution Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/
galactic-zone-shows-why-we-should-legalize-prostitution-2013-10 [https://perma.cc/
M64W-7ZE8].
332. See Michael Martinez, What to know about Nevada’s legal brothels, CNN (Oct.
19, 2016) https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/14/us/lamar-odom-nevada-brothels/
index.html [https://perma.cc/U6SZ-LAQE].
333. See, e.g., Rachel Chason, ‘A mecca for prostitution’? A new bill proposes decriminalizing sex work in D.C., WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/a-mecca-for-prostitution-a-new-billproposes-decriminalizing-sex-work-in-dc/2017/10/13/18f3dd12-adf4-11e7-a908a3470754bbb9_story.html [https://perma.cc/QSE9-7XJF]; Ethan DeWitt, N.H. House
votes to create commission studying decriminalizing sex work, CONCORD MONITOR
(Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.concordmonitor.com/House-passes-bill-creating-studycommission-for-sex-work-legalization-14782126 [https://perma.cc/LJ3G-CRJX]; Chris
Morris, California Courts May Consider Legalizing Prostitution, FORTUNE (Oct. 20,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/20/california-legal-prostitution/ [https://perma.cc/
C9Z5-8FBW].
334. H.R. 1865 § 4 (as reported to House, Feb. 20, 2018).
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provision. While it also allowed states to prosecute under state
laws for conduct violating the proposed § 2421A, this could
require states to pass a law substantially similar to this new
statute. Given that it took over a decade for every state to pass
a human trafficking law, this would be no small task. Moreover, just as tech companies have successfully fought and opposed the effort to pass state laws that prohibit facilitating
online sex trafficking, they will fight such statutes in every
state. Given that tech companies will be joined by those seeking
to legalize prostitution, the chances of a state passing such a
law appear to be low. Consequently, this provision offers little
to the state attorneys general who have not endorsed this bill
but who asked Congress to simply amend § 230 to include state
human trafficking laws on the list of exemptions from § 230
immunity.
2.

SESTA

The focus of SESTA is on the shortfalls of § 230 and the demand of courts for clarification, of survivors for access to justice, and of state prosecutors for the ability to enforce their own
human trafficking laws. Its new focus is on amending § 230 to
include sex trafficking as exempt from § 230 immunity.
Congress did not originally include sex trafficking because
sex trafficking was not recognized as a federal crime until four
years after the passage of the CDA. SESTA clarifies this by including the non-controversial statement that it is the policy of
the United States to “ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal and civil law relating to sex trafficking.” 335 SESTA also
provides for the CDA to not preclude a civil action brought
under § 1595 for sex-trafficking offenses or any state law criminal prosecution for actions that would violate sex-trafficking
laws. 336 This provision would seem to resolve the ambiguity
created by the First Circuit when it expanded § 230 immunity
to preclude civil cases under § 1595. Therefore, under SESTA,
victims have access to the private right of action in federal
court created under § 1595, and state prosecutors have the abil-

335. S. 1693 § 3(a).
336. Id.
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ity to enforce state sex-trafficking laws that cover behavior illegal under § 1591.
SESTA does not amend § 230 to allow for a private right of
action on the state level. However, it does amend § 1595 to allow state attorneys general to sue a website in a federal court
on behalf of citizens who have been threatened or adversely
affected by a city’s violation of § 1591. 337 This provision appears
to be modeled after the state enforcement provision of the Consumer Review Fairness Act. 338 While not a private right of action for victims, it is an additional avenue to hold websites that
facilitate sex trafficking accountable.
SESTA also responds to the First Circuit’s concern that § 1591
does not define “participation in a venture.” The revised Senate
Bill defines “participation in a venture” as “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection
(a)(1).” 339
3.

Emergence of a FOSTA-SESTA Compromise

With only one bill, SESTA, having the support of survivors,
law enforcement, and the tech industry, it appeared Congress
was in a logjam. When the Goodlatte Substitute FOSTA came
to a floor vote, however, a significant amendment by Congresswoman Mimi Walters emerged. This amendment effectively preserved the positive components of SESTA, but added
the new Mann Act crime that Congressman Goodlatte claimed
essential to combatting online sex trafficking. 340 This new
House FOSTA eliminated the language that would have codified de facto absolute immunity, included the federal private
right of action, and enabled enforcement of state sex-trafficking
laws. 341 The legislation with the Walters amendments gained
the backing of those who supported SESTA and was passed
overwhelmingly in the House 388–25. 342 Having passed the
House, this version went to the Senate for a vote.
337. Id. § 5.
338. See 15 U.S.C. § 45b(e) (2012).
339. S. 1693 § 4(2).
340. H.Amdt. 526 to H.R. 1865, available at https://www.congress.gov/amendment/
115th-congress/house-amendment/526/text [https://perma.cc/MFQ7-2JSJ].
341. H.R. 1865 § 2 (as placed on Senate Calendar March 1, 2018).
342. 164 CONG. REC. H1318–19 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2018).
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This SESTA-FOSTA compromise states that § 230 “was never
intended to provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with
sex trafficking victims.” 343 It further states that clarification of
§ 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 is warranted to ensure that that section does not provide legal protection to such
websites. 344
The compromise includes the new Mann Act charge of promotion or facilitation of prostitution. 345 Critically, however, the
compromise explicitly eliminates § 230 immunity against civil
claims under § 1595 for sex-trafficking violations and state
criminal charges, if the conduct is an alleged violation of state
sex-trafficking laws, the new promotion of prostitution provision, or other federal law. 346 It also defines the term, “participation in a venture,” which is unlawful when the venture is sex
trafficking, and which the First Circuit noted had not yet been
defined. This is now defined to encompass “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating sex trafficking.” 347 The legislation also enables state attorneys general to bring a parens patriae civil suit against a website on behalf of state residents. 348
Finally, the legislation includes a savings clause, ensuring that
claims currently allowed under federal or state law, such as
those in J.S., remain permissible. 349
On March 21, 2018, this compromise bill came to a vote in the
Senate. If this compromise bill were accepted without change
by the Senate the FOSTA-SESTA compromise would become
law upon the President’s signature. Suddenly, amending § 230
was in reach.
Senator Ron Wyden, the same Senator who attempted to
stop the bill by placing a hold on SESTA, made a last ditch ef343. H.R. 1865 § 2 (as placed on Senate Calendar March 1, 2018).
344. Id.
345. Id. § 3.
346. Id. § 4.
347. Id. § 5. The final bill also includes a requirement that the Government Accounting Office report to Congress three years after enactment data regarding
civil actions and restitution. Id. § 8.
348. Id. § 6.
349. S. 1693 § 6; H.R. 1865 § 5.
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fort to derail the legislation. This came in the form of two
amendments. The first purported to provide additional funding to the Department of Justice to combat human trafficking.
While this gesture may appear to represent an effort to stem
sex trafficking, it was actually a transparent attempt to halt the
bill. If the compromise bill was amended in any way, it would
eventually be required to return to the House for a vote. The
House would never have accepted such a spending increase,
and the bill would have died. This amendment was resoundingly rejected by the Senate. 350
Senator Wyden’s second amendment tried to water down
some of the provisions to protect interactive service providers. 351 After the defeat of his funding amendment, however, he
withdrew this second amendment. 352 Still, he warned that he
would “turn back to this topic in short order . . . for a vote at
that time.” 353 Curiously, he stated that his reason for withdrawal was that his colleagues faced “so much political headwind”
to vote against this version of an anti-trafficking bill. 354 This is
curious, because for many years Congress would not even entertain and changes to § 230 in light of tech opposition. For
years, Congress ignored the pleas of sex-trafficking survivors
and allied itself with the tech industry. The notion that politicians are beholden to survivors is belied by the near-decade
wait to amend this law.
B.

Consider the Big Picture

If it took over fifteen years for Congress to act regarding this
specific, yet obvious, problem on the Internet, how much more
time will it take for Congress to respond to the more fundamental problem of the CDA? Congress was correct about two
facts in 1996: the Internet was a nascent industry, perhaps in
need of some support to get off the ground, and its potential
for distributing exploitative material was massive. Now the
Internet is no longer nascent—it is as vital as a utility and as
350. See 164 CONG. REC. S1871 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018) (21–78).
351. S.Amdt. 2212 to H.R. 1865, available at https://www.congress.gov/amendment/
115th-congress/senate-amendment/2212?r=11 [https://perma.cc/BBW6-G4UT].
352. 164 CONG. REC. S1871 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2018) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
353. Id.
354. Id.
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powerful as a superstate. Rather than simply distributing exploitative material, it is exploitative itself. A massive exploitative industry is one perhaps in no need of special protections at
all. Rather, the time has come to examine not whether the government should protect citizens from these powerful industries, but how it should do so. The current system of allowing
online businesses to avoid responsibility for “either for what
their users do or for the harm that their services can cause” 355
must be reexamined.
V.

CONCLUSION

History tells us that many industries in their infancy thrive
with little regulation. When they reach a certain size and import to the citizenry, however, the government may need to
regulate them for the sake of public health and safety. Railroads, utilities, and finance have all experienced this cycle. 356
Congress must now consider the viability of a legal regime in
which online companies profit from social ills and then claim
immunity from criminal liability.
But that is a question for another day. The pressing problem
facing society is the open market to sexually traffic the most
vulnerable, and the de facto absolute immunity created by
courts for the market operators. It appears that congressional
action challenging this unintended immunity required significant pressure from victims, courts, and state officials. In the
meantime, the victimized continued to be denied justice.
In 1996, Congress responded to one unpopular court decision by legislation to protect tech companies from a perceived
threat. After years of online advertisements selling sextrafficking victims and numerous other victims, court deci355. Internet Firms’ Legal Immunity is Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21716661-platforms-have-benefitedgreatly-special-legal-and-regulatory-treatment-internet-firms [https://perma.cc/
35FB-NSFM].
356. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 36, at 422; see also Extremist Content Hearings,
supra note 290 (statements of Sen. Graham, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
and Michael Smith, Fellow at New America), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/extremist-content-and-russian-disinformation-online-working-withtech-to-find-solutions [https://perma.cc/PQ59-7S99]; Internet Firms’ Legal Immunity
is Under Threat, supra note 350.
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sions, and state legislators calling for clarification of legislation,
Congress failed to respond. Instead, it appeared to continue to
protect the tech industry. Now, finally Congress has acted to
close this legal loophole. The story for sex-trafficking survivors
and their families was one of injustice; now it has become one
of justice delayed. While the new legislation is a positive step,
delayed justice is not without cost. The cost was borne by hundreds of trafficking victims, sold online and raped repeatedly
while Congress failed to act.

